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The usercopy checking code currently calls __va(__pa(...)) to check for
aliases on symbols. Switch to using lm_alias instead.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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While running a compile on arm64, I hit a memory exposure
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from fffffc0000f3b1a8 (buffer_head) (1 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT
nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_broute bridge stp
llc ebtable_nat ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_nat
nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle
iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4
nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle
ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables vfat fat xgene_edac
xgene_enet edac_core i2c_xgene_slimpro i2c_core at803x realtek xgene_dma
mdio_xgene gpio_dwapb gpio_xgene_sb xgene_rng mailbox_xgene_slimpro nfsd
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc xfs libcrc32c sdhci_of_arasan
sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core xhci_plat_hcd gpio_keys
CPU: 0 PID: 19744 Comm: updatedb Tainted: G W 4.8.0-rc3-threadinfo+ #1
Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.12 Aug 12 2016
task: fffffe03df944c00 task.stack: fffffe00d128c000
PC is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
LR is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
...
[<fffffc00082b4280>] __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
[<fffffc00082cdc30>] filldir64+0x158/0x1a0
[<fffffc0000f327e8>] __fat_readdir+0x4a0/0x558 [fat]
[<fffffc0000f328d4>] fat_readdir+0x34/0x40 [fat]
[<fffffc00082cd8f8>] iterate_dir+0x190/0x1e0
[<fffffc00082cde58>] SyS_getdents64+0x88/0x120
[<fffffc0008082c70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
fffffc0000f3b1a8 is a module address. Modules may have compiled in
strings which could get copied to userspace. In this instance, it
looks like "." which matches with a size of 1 byte. Extend the
is_vmalloc_addr check to be is_vmalloc_or_module_addr to cover
all possible cases.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been
found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker
by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be
tracked down later.
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326
Reported-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@freedesktop.org>
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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When running with a local patch which moves the '_stext' symbol to the
very beginning of the kernel text area, I got the following panic with
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff88103dfff000 (<linear kernel text>) (4096 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:79!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
...
CPU: 0 PID: 4800 Comm: cp Not tainted 4.8.0-rc3.after+ #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0X3D66, BIOS 2.5.4 01/22/2016
task: ffff880817444140 task.stack: ffff880816274000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8121c796>] __check_object_size+0x76/0x413
RSP: 0018:ffff880816277c40 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000006b RBX: ffff88103dfff000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88081f80dfa8 RDI: ffff88081f80dfa8
RBP: ffff880816277c90 R08: 000000000000054c R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000006 R12: 0000000000001000
R13: ffff88103e000000 R14: ffff88103dffffff R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fb9d1750800(0000) GS:ffff88081f800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000021d2000 CR3: 000000081a08f000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
Stack:
ffff880816277cc8 0000000000010000 000000043de07000 0000000000000000
0000000000001000 ffff880816277e60 0000000000001000 ffff880816277e28
000000000000c000 0000000000001000 ffff880816277ce8 ffffffff8136c3a6
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8136c3a6>] copy_page_to_iter_iovec+0xa6/0x1c0
[<ffffffff8136e766>] copy_page_to_iter+0x16/0x90
[<ffffffff811970e3>] generic_file_read_iter+0x3e3/0x7c0
[<ffffffffa06a738d>] ? xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0xad/0x260 [xfs]
[<ffffffff816e6262>] ? down_read+0x12/0x40
[<ffffffffa06a61b1>] xfs_file_buffered_aio_read+0x51/0xc0 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa06a6692>] xfs_file_read_iter+0x62/0xb0 [xfs]
[<ffffffff812224cf>] __vfs_read+0xdf/0x130
[<ffffffff81222c9e>] vfs_read+0x8e/0x140
[<ffffffff81224195>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
[<ffffffff81003a47>] do_syscall_64+0x67/0x160
[<ffffffff816e8421>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:[<00007fb9d0c33c00>] 0x7fb9d0c33c00
RSP: 002b:00007ffc9c262f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: fffffffffff8ffff RCX: 00007fb9d0c33c00
RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 00000000021c3000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000021c3000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffc9c264d6c
R10: 00007ffc9c262c50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000010000
R13: 00007ffc9c2630b0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000010000
Code: 81 48 0f 44 d0 48 c7 c6 90 4d a3 81 48 c7 c0 bb b3 a2 81 48 0f 44 f0 4d 89 e1 48 89 d9 48 c7 c7 68 16 a3 81 31 c0 e8 f4 57 f7 ff <0f> 0b 48 8d 90 00 40 00 00 48 39 d3 0f 83 22 01 00 00 48 39 c3
RIP [<ffffffff8121c796>] __check_object_size+0x76/0x413
RSP <ffff880816277c40>
The checked object's range [ffff88103dfff000, ffff88103e000000) is
valid, so there shouldn't have been a BUG. The hardened usercopy code
got confused because the range's ending address is the same as the
kernel's text starting address at 0xffff88103e000000. The overlap check
is slightly off.
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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check_bogus_address() checked for pointer overflow using this expression,
where 'ptr' has type 'const void *':
ptr + n < ptr
Since pointer wraparound is undefined behavior, gcc at -O2 by default
treats it like the following, which would not behave as intended:
(long)n < 0
Fortunately, this doesn't currently happen for kernel code because kernel
code is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow. But the expression should be
fixed anyway to use well-defined integer arithmetic, since it could be
treated differently by different compilers in the future or could be
reported by tools checking for undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.
This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
- object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
- object must not extend before/after the current process stack
- object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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