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Commit 0ca50d12fe46 added a restriction that the address must belong to
the output interface, so that sctp will use the right interface even
when using secondary addresses.
But it breaks IPVS setups, on which people is used to attach VIP
addresses to loopback interface on real servers. It's preferred to
attach to the interface actually in use, but it's a very common setup
and that used to work.
This patch then saves the first routing good result, even if it would be
going out through an interface that doesn't have that address. If no
better hit found, it's then used. This effectively restores the original
behavior if no better interface could be found.
Fixes: 0ca50d12fe46 ("sctp: fix src address selection if using secondary addresses")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit 0ca50d12fe46 failed to release the reference to dst entries that
it decided to skip.
Fixes: 0ca50d12fe46 ("sctp: fix src address selection if using secondary addresses")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When removing an non-primary transport during ASCONF
processing, we end up traversing the transport list
twice: once in sctp_cmd_del_non_primary, and once in
sctp_assoc_del_peer. We can avoid the second
search and call sctp_assoc_rm_peer() instead.
Found by code inspection during code reviews.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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RFC 5061:
This is an opaque integer assigned by the sender to identify each
request parameter. The receiver of the ASCONF Chunk will copy this
32-bit value into the ASCONF Response Correlation ID field of the
ASCONF-ACK response parameter. The sender of the ASCONF can use this
same value in the ASCONF-ACK to find which request the response is
for. Note that the receiver MUST NOT change this 32-bit value.
Address Parameter: TLV
This field contains an IPv4 or IPv6 address parameter, as described
in Section 3.3.2.1 of [RFC4960].
ASCONF chunk with Error Cause Indication Parameter (Unresolvable Address)
should be sent if the Delete IP Address is not part of the association.
Endpoint A Endpoint B
(ESTABLISHED) (ESTABLISHED)
ASCONF ----------------->
(Delete IP Address)
<----------------- ASCONF-ACK
(Unresolvable Address)
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit f8d960524328 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown")
fixed a problem with excessive retransmissions in the SHUTDOWN_PENDING by not
resetting the association overall_error_count. This allowed the association
to better enforce assoc.max_retrans limit.
However, the same issue still exists when the association is in SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED
state. In this state, HB-ACKs will continue to reset the overall_error_count
for the association would extend the lifetime of association unnecessarily.
This patch solves this by resetting the overall_error_count whenever the current
state is small then SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING. As a small side-effect, we
end up also handling SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT and SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT
states, but they are not really impacted because we disable Heartbeats in those
states.
Fixes: Commit f8d960524328 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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in sctp_process_asconf(), we get address parameter from the beginning of
the addip params. but we never check if it's really there. if the addr
param is not there, it still can pass sctp_verify_asconf(), then to be
handled by sctp_process_asconf(), it will not be safe.
so add a code in sctp_verify_asconf() to check the address parameter is in
the beginning, or return false to send abort.
note that this can also detect multiple address parameters, and reject it.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Conflicts:
arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_ethss.c
net/bridge/br_multicast.c
net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
All four conflicts were cases of simple overlapping
changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Back then when we added support for SCTP_SNDINFO/SCTP_RCVINFO from
RFC6458 5.3.4/5.3.5, we decided to add a deprecation warning for the
(as per RFC deprecated) SCTP_SNDRCV via commit bbbea41d5e53 ("net:
sctp: deprecate rfc6458, 5.3.2. SCTP_SNDRCV support"), see [1].
Imho, it was not a good idea, and we should just revert that message
for a couple of reasons:
1) It's uapi and therefore set in stone forever.
2) To be able to run on older and newer kernels, an SCTP application
would need to probe for both, SCTP_SNDRCV, but also SCTP_SNDINFO/
SCTP_RCVINFO support, so that on older kernels, it can make use
of SCTP_SNDRCV, and on newer kernels SCTP_SNDINFO/SCTP_RCVINFO.
In my (limited) experience, a lot of SCTP appliances are migrating
to newer kernels only ve(ee)ry slowly.
3) Some people don't have the chance to change their applications,
f.e. due to proprietary legacy stuff. So, they'll hit this warning
in fast path and are stuck with older kernels.
But i.e. due to point 1) I really fail to see the benefit of a warning.
So just revert that for now, the issue was reported up Jamal.
[1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/321960/
Reported-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Cookie ACK is always received by the association initiator, so fix the
comment to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In short, sctp is likely to incorrectly choose src address if socket is
bound to secondary addresses. This patch fixes it by adding a new check
that checks if such src address belongs to the interface that routing
identified as output.
This is enough to avoid rp_filter drops on remote peer.
Details:
Currently, sctp will do a routing attempt without specifying the src
address and compare the returned value (preferred source) with the
addresses that the socket is bound to. When using secondary addresses,
this will not match.
Then it will try specifying each of the addresses that the socket is
bound to and re-routing, checking if that address is valid as src for
that dst. Thing is, this check alone is weak:
# ip r l
192.168.100.0/24 dev eth1 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.100.149
192.168.122.0/24 dev eth0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.122.147
# ip a l
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 52:54:00:15:18:6a brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
inet 192.168.122.147/24 brd 192.168.122.255 scope global dynamic eth0
valid_lft 2160sec preferred_lft 2160sec
inet 192.168.122.148/24 scope global secondary eth0
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::5054:ff:fe15:186a/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 52:54:00:b3:91:46 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
inet 192.168.100.149/24 brd 192.168.100.255 scope global dynamic eth1
valid_lft 2162sec preferred_lft 2162sec
inet 192.168.100.148/24 scope global secondary eth1
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::5054:ff:feb3:9146/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
4: ens9: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 52:54:00:05:47:ee brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
inet6 fe80::5054:ff:fe05:47ee/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
# ip r g 192.168.100.193 from 192.168.122.148
192.168.100.193 from 192.168.122.148 dev eth1
cache
Even if you specify an interface:
# ip r g 192.168.100.193 from 192.168.122.148 oif eth1
192.168.100.193 from 192.168.122.148 dev eth1
cache
Although this would be valid, peers using rp_filter will drop such
packets as their src doesn't match the routes for that interface.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Paves the day for the next patch. Functionality stays untouched.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is NULL pointer dereference possible during statistics update if the route
used for OOTB responce is removed at unfortunate time. If the route exists when
we receive OOTB packet and we finally jump into sctp_packet_transmit() to send
ABORT, but in the meantime route is removed under our feet, we take "no_route"
path and try to update stats with IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(asoc->base.sk), ...).
But sctp_ootb_pkt_new() used to prepare responce packet doesn't call
sctp_transport_set_owner() and therefore there is no asoc associated with this
packet. Probably temporary asoc just for OOTB responces is overkill, so just
introduce a check like in all other places in sctp_packet_transmit(), where
"asoc" is dereferenced.
To reproduce this, one needs to
0. ensure that sctp module is loaded (otherwise ABORT is not generated)
1. remove default route on the machine
2. while true; do
ip route del [interface-specific route]
ip route add [interface-specific route]
done
3. send enough OOTB packets (i.e. HB REQs) from another host to trigger ABORT
responce
On x86_64 the crash looks like this:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G O 4.0.5-1-ARCH #1
Hardware name: ...
task: ffffffff818124c0 ti: ffffffff81800000 task.ti: ffffffff81800000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp]
RSP: 0018:ffff880127c037b8 EFLAGS: 00010296
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000015ff66b480
RDX: 00000015ff66b400 RSI: ffff880127c17200 RDI: ffff880123403700
RBP: ffff880127c03888 R08: 0000000000017200 R09: ffffffff814625af
R10: ffffea00047e4680 R11: 00000000ffffff80 R12: ffff8800b0d38a28
R13: ffff8800b0d38a28 R14: ffff8800b3e88000 R15: ffffffffa05f24e0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880127c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000000c855b000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
Stack:
ffff880127c03910 ffff8800b0d38a28 ffffffff8189d240 ffff88011f91b400
ffff880127c03828 ffffffffa05c94c5 0000000000000000 ffff8800baa1c520
0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa05c94c5>] ? sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8.isra.20+0x85/0x140 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa05d6b42>] ? sctp_transport_put+0x52/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa05d0bfc>] sctp_do_sm+0xb8c/0x19a0 [sctp]
[<ffffffff810b0e00>] ? trigger_load_balance+0x90/0x210
[<ffffffff810e0329>] ? update_process_times+0x59/0x60
[<ffffffff812c7a40>] ? timerqueue_add+0x60/0xb0
[<ffffffff810e0549>] ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x29/0xa0
[<ffffffff8101f599>] ? read_tsc+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff8116d4b5>] ? put_page+0x55/0x60
[<ffffffff810ee1ad>] ? clockevents_program_event+0x6d/0x100
[<ffffffff81462b68>] ? skb_free_head+0x58/0x80
[<ffffffffa029a10b>] ? chksum_update+0x1b/0x27 [crc32c_generic]
[<ffffffff81283f3e>] ? crypto_shash_update+0xce/0xf0
[<ffffffffa05d3993>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x113/0x280 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa05dd4e6>] sctp_inq_push+0x46/0x60 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa05ed7a0>] sctp_rcv+0x880/0x910 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa05ecb50>] ? sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0xb0/0xb0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa05ecb70>] ? sctp_csum_update+0x20/0x20 [sctp]
[<ffffffff814b05a5>] ? ip_route_input_noref+0x235/0xd30
[<ffffffff81051d6b>] ? ack_ioapic_level+0x7b/0x150
[<ffffffff814b27be>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xae/0x210
[<ffffffff814b2e15>] ip_local_deliver+0x35/0x90
[<ffffffff814b2a15>] ip_rcv_finish+0xf5/0x370
[<ffffffff814b3128>] ip_rcv+0x2b8/0x3a0
[<ffffffff81474193>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x763/0xa50
[<ffffffff81476c28>] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
[<ffffffff81476cb0>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x40/0xd0
[<ffffffff814776c8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x120
[<ffffffffa03946aa>] rtl8169_poll+0x2da/0x660 [r8169]
[<ffffffff8147896a>] net_rx_action+0x21a/0x360
[<ffffffff81078dc1>] __do_softirq+0xe1/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8107912d>] irq_exit+0xad/0xb0
[<ffffffff8157d158>] do_IRQ+0x58/0xf0
[<ffffffff8157b06d>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d
<EOI>
[<ffffffff810e1218>] ? hrtimer_start+0x18/0x20
[<ffffffffa05d65f9>] ? sctp_transport_destroy_rcu+0x29/0x30 [sctp]
[<ffffffff81020c50>] ? mwait_idle+0x60/0xa0
[<ffffffff810216ef>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20
[<ffffffff810b731c>] cpu_startup_entry+0x3ec/0x480
[<ffffffff8156b365>] rest_init+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff818eb035>] start_kernel+0x48b/0x4ac
[<ffffffff818ea120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120
[<ffffffff818ea339>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[<ffffffff818ea49c>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x161/0x184
Code: 90 48 8b 80 b8 00 00 00 48 89 85 70 ff ff ff 48 83 bd 70 ff ff ff 00 0f 85 cd fa ff ff 48 89 df 31 db e8 18 63 e7 e0 48 8b 45 80 <48> 8b 40 20 48 8b 40 30 48 8b 80 68 01 00 00 65 48 ff 40 78 e9
RIP [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp]
RSP <ffff880127c037b8>
CR2: 0000000000000020
---[ end trace 5aec7fd2dc983574 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Kernel Offset: 0x0 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff9fffffff)
drm_kms_helper: panic occurred, switching back to text console
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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No more users, so it can now be removed.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c
net/packet/af_packet.c
Both conflicts were cases of simple overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently, we can ask to authenticate DATA chunks and we can send DATA
chunks on the same packet as COOKIE_ECHO, but if you try to combine
both, the DATA chunk will be sent unauthenticated and peer won't accept
it, leading to a communication failure.
This happens because even though the data was queued after it was
requested to authenticate DATA chunks, it was also queued before we
could know that remote peer can handle authenticating, so
sctp_auth_send_cid() returns false.
The fix is whenever we set up an active key, re-check send queue for
chunks that now should be authenticated. As a result, such packet will
now contain COOKIE_ECHO + AUTH + DATA chunks, in that order.
Reported-by: Liu Wei <weliu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Instead of doing the rt6->rt6i_node check whenever we need
to get the route's cookie. Refactor it into rt6_get_cookie().
It is a prep work to handle FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH and also
percpu rt6_info later.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch removes the assumptions that the returned rt is always
a RTF_CACHE entry with the rt6i_dst and rt6i_src containing the
destination and source address. The dst and src can be recovered from
the calling site.
We may consider to rename (rt6i_dst, rt6i_src) to
(rt6i_key_dst, rt6i_key_src) later.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In preparation for changing how struct net is refcounted
on kernel sockets pass the knowledge that we are creating
a kernel socket from sock_create_kern through to sk_alloc.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Move the declaration for external variables to sctp.h file avoiding
to repeatedly declare them with extern keyword.
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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After TIPC doesn't depend on iocb argument in its internal
implementations of sendmsg() and recvmsg() hooks defined in proto
structure, no any user is using iocb argument in them at all now.
Then we can drop the redundant iocb argument completely from kinds of
implementations of both sendmsg() and recvmsg() in the entire
networking stack.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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As part of an effort to move skb->dropcount to skb->cb[] use a common
macro in protocol families using skb->cb[] for ancillary data to
validate available room in skb->cb[].
Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/vxlan.c
drivers/vhost/net.c
include/linux/if_vlan.h
net/core/dev.c
The net/core/dev.c conflict was the overlap of one commit marking an
existing function static whilst another was adding a new function.
In the include/linux/if_vlan.h case, the type used for a local
variable was changed in 'net', whereas the function got rewritten
to fix a stacked vlan bug in 'net-next'.
In drivers/vhost/net.c, Al Viro's iov_iter conversions in 'net-next'
overlapped with an endainness fix for VHOST 1.0 in 'net'.
In drivers/net/vxlan.c, vxlan_find_vni() added a 'flags' parameter
in 'net-next' whereas in 'net' there was a bug fix to pass in the
correct network namespace pointer in calls to this function.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The kfree() function tests whether its argument is NULL and then
returns immediately. Thus the test around the call is not needed.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Acked-By: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sctp_process_param
When making use of RFC5061, section 4.2.4. for setting the primary IP
address, we're passing a wrong parameter header to param_type2af(),
resulting always in NULL being returned.
At this point, param.p points to a sctp_addip_param struct, containing
a sctp_paramhdr (type = 0xc004, length = var), and crr_id as a correlation
id. Followed by that, as also presented in RFC5061 section 4.2.4., comes
the actual sctp_addr_param, which also contains a sctp_paramhdr, but
this time with the correct type SCTP_PARAM_IPV{4,6}_ADDRESS that
param_type2af() can make use of. Since we already hold a pointer to
addr_param from previous line, just reuse it for param_type2af().
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Saran Maruti Ramanara <saran.neti@telus.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as
already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit
auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally
still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to
have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ...
[ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230
[ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0
[ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...]
[ 534.939704] Call Trace:
[ 534.951833] [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[ 534.984213] [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[ 535.015025] [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170
[ 535.045661] [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0
[ 535.074593] [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50
[ 535.105239] [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp]
[ 535.138606] [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0
[ 535.166848] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
... or depending on the the application, for example this one:
[ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0
[ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0
[ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...]
[ 1370.963431] Call Trace:
[ 1370.974632] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.000863] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.027154] [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170
[ 1371.054679] [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[ 1371.080183] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten:
[ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten
[ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
[ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494
[ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566
[ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310
[ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
[ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp]
[ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp]
[ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...]
[ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494
[ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8
[ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230
[ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40
[ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp]
[ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp]
[ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp]
Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at
heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice
when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again
from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on
the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation
of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected
at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation).
Reference counting of auth keys revisited:
Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations
in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being
added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached
and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds
a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which
keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc
or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and
the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped.
User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct
sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or
adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes
with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old
sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt()
on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either
endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places)
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key().
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's
and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key
directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops
the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we
eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with
intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in
sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to
set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret
material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track
of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76
("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of
this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures
being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly
on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are
being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount
of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is
to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
I.e. one-to-many sockets in SCTP are not required to explicitly
call into connect(2) or sctp_connectx(2) prior to data exchange.
Instead, they can directly invoke sendmsg(2) and the SCTP stack
will automatically trigger connection establishment through 4WHS
via sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE(). However, this in its current
implementation is racy: INIT is being sent out immediately (as
it cannot be bundled anyway) and the rest of the DATA chunks are
queued up for later xmit when connection is established, meaning
sendmsg(2) will return successfully. This behaviour can result
in an undesired side-effect that the kernel made the application
think the data has already been transmitted, although none of it
has actually left the machine, worst case even after close(2)'ing
the socket.
Instead, when the association from client side has been shut down
e.g. first gracefully through SCTP_EOF and then close(2), the
client could afterwards still receive the server's INIT_ACK due
to a connection with higher latency. This INIT_ACK is then considered
out of the blue and hence responded with ABORT as there was no
alive assoc found anymore. This can be easily reproduced f.e.
with sctp_test application from lksctp. One way to fix this race
is to wait for the handshake to actually complete.
The fix defers waiting after sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE() and
sctp_primitive_SEND() succeeded, so that DATA chunks cooked up
from sctp_sendmsg() have already been placed into the output
queue through the side-effect interpreter, and therefore can then
be bundeled together with COOKIE_ECHO control chunks.
strace from example application (shortened):
socket(PF_INET, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP) = 3
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(1)=[{"hello", 5}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(28)={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(8888), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.115")},
msg_iov(0)=[], msg_controllen=48, {cmsg_len=48, cmsg_level=0x84 /* SOL_??? */, cmsg_type=, ...},
msg_flags=0}, 0) = 0 // graceful shutdown for SOCK_SEQPACKET via SCTP_EOF
close(3) = 0
tcpdump before patch (fooling the application):
22:33:36.306142 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3879023686] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3139201684]
22:33:36.316619 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.41462: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3345394793] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3380109591]
22:33:36.317600 IP 192.168.1.114.41462 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [ABORT]
tcpdump after patch:
14:28:58.884116 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 438593213] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 3092969729]
14:28:58.888414 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 381429855] [rwnd: 106496] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 2141904492]
14:28:58.888638 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969729] [...]
14:28:58.893278 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK] , (2) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969729] [a_rwnd 106491] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:58.893591 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969730] [...]
14:28:59.096963 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969730] [a_rwnd 106496] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:59.097086 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969731] [...] , (2) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3092969732] [...]
14:28:59.103218 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3092969732] [a_rwnd 106486] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
14:28:59.103330 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN]
14:28:59.107793 IP 192.168.1.115.8888 > 192.168.1.114.35846: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN ACK]
14:28:59.107890 IP 192.168.1.114.35846 > 192.168.1.115.8888: sctp (1) [SHUTDOWN COMPLETE]
Looks like this bug is from the pre-git history museum. ;)
Fixes: 08707d5482df ("lksctp-2_5_31-0_5_1.patch")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Introduce helper macro for_each_cmsghdr as a wrapper of the enumerating
cmsghdr from msghdr, just cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-desc.c
drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
Overlapping changes in both conflict cases.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Note that the code _using_ ->msg_iter at that point will be very
unhappy with anything other than unshifted iovec-backed iov_iter.
We still need to convert users to proper primitives.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
To accomodate for enough headroom for tunnels, use MAX_HEADER instead
of LL_MAX_HEADER. Robert reported that he has hit after roughly 40hrs
of trinity an skb_under_panic() via SCTP output path (see reference).
I couldn't reproduce it from here, but not using MAX_HEADER as elsewhere
in other protocols might be one possible cause for this.
In any case, it looks like accounting on chunks themself seems to look
good as the skb already passed the SCTP output path and did not hit
any skb_over_panic(). Given tunneling was enabled in his .config, the
headroom would have been expanded by MAX_HEADER in this case.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/1/507
Fixes: 594ccc14dfe4d ("[SCTP] Replace incorrect use of dev_alloc_skb with alloc_skb in sctp_packet_transmit().")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
It's just silly to hold the skb destructor argument around inside
skb->cb[] as we currently do in SCTP.
Nowadays, we're sort of cheating on data accounting in the sense
that due to commit 4c3a5bdae293 ("sctp: Don't charge for data in
sndbuf again when transmitting packet"), we orphan the skb already
in the SCTP output path, i.e. giving back charged data memory, and
use a different destructor only to make sure the sk doesn't vanish
on skb destruction time. Thus, cb[] is still valid here as we
operate within the SCTP layer. (It's generally actually a big
candidate for future rework, imho.)
However, storing the destructor in the cb[] can easily cause issues
should an non sctp_packet_set_owner_w()'ed skb ever escape the SCTP
layer, since cb[] may get overwritten by lower layers and thus can
corrupt the chunk pointer. There are no such issues at present,
but lets keep the chunk in destructor_arg, as this is the actual
purpose for it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4vf/sge.c
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_phy.c
sge.c was overlapping two changes, one to use the new
__dev_alloc_page() in net-next, and one to use s->fl_pg_order in net.
ixgbe_phy.c was a set of overlapping whitespace changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
A very minimal and simple user space application allocating an SCTP
socket, setting SCTP_AUTH_KEY setsockopt(2) on it and then closing
the socket again will leak the memory containing the authentication
key from user space:
unreferenced object 0xffff8800837047c0 (size 16):
comm "a.out", pid 2789, jiffies 4296954322 (age 192.258s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816d7e8e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811c88d8>] __kmalloc+0xe8/0x270
[<ffffffffa0870c23>] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa08718b1>] sctp_auth_set_key+0xa1/0x140 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa086b383>] sctp_setsockopt+0xd03/0x1180 [sctp]
[<ffffffff815bfd94>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff815beb61>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816e58a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
This is bad because of two things, we can bring down a machine from
user space when auth_enable=1, but also we would leave security sensitive
keying material in memory without clearing it after use. The issue is
that sctp_auth_create_key() already sets the refcount to 1, but after
allocation sctp_auth_set_key() does an additional refcount on it, and
thus leaving it around when we free the socket.
Fixes: 65b07e5d0d0 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Alternative to RPS/RFS is to use hardware support for multiple
queues.
Then split a set of million of sockets into worker threads, each
one using epoll() to manage events on its own socket pool.
Ideally, we want one thread per RX/TX queue/cpu, but we have no way to
know after accept() or connect() on which queue/cpu a socket is managed.
We normally use one cpu per RX queue (IRQ smp_affinity being properly
set), so remembering on socket structure which cpu delivered last packet
is enough to solve the problem.
After accept(), connect(), or even file descriptor passing around
processes, applications can use :
int cpu;
socklen_t len = sizeof(cpu);
getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_INCOMING_CPU, &cpu, &len);
And use this information to put the socket into the right silo
for optimal performance, as all networking stack should run
on the appropriate cpu, without need to send IPI (RPS/RFS).
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
This encapsulates all of the skb_copy_datagram_iovec() callers
with call argument signature "skb, offset, msghdr->msg_iov, length".
When we move to iov_iters in the networking, the iov_iter object will
sit in the msghdr.
Having a helper like this means there will be less places to touch
during that transformation.
Based upon descriptions and patch from Al Viro.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Fixes checkpatch warning:
"WARNING: Prefer seq_puts to seq_printf"
Signed-off-by: Michele Baldessari <michele@acksyn.org>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
It is often quite helpful to be able to know the state of a transport
outside of the application itself (for troubleshooting purposes or for
monitoring purposes). Add it under /proc/net/sctp/remaddr.
Signed-off-by: Michele Baldessari <michele@acksyn.org>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Include fixes for netrom and dsa (Fabian Frederick and Florian
Fainelli)
2) Fix FIXED_PHY support in stmmac, from Giuseppe CAVALLARO.
3) Several SKB use after free fixes (vxlan, openvswitch, vxlan,
ip_tunnel, fou), from Li ROngQing.
4) fec driver PTP support fixes from Luwei Zhou and Nimrod Andy.
5) Use after free in virtio_net, from Michael S Tsirkin.
6) Fix flow mask handling for megaflows in openvswitch, from Pravin B
Shelar.
7) ISDN gigaset and capi bug fixes from Tilman Schmidt.
8) Fix route leak in ip_send_unicast_reply(), from Vasily Averin.
9) Fix two eBPF JIT bugs on x86, from Alexei Starovoitov.
10) TCP_SKB_CB() reorganization caused a few regressions, fixed by Cong
Wang and Eric Dumazet.
11) Don't overwrite end of SKB when parsing malformed sctp ASCONF
chunks, from Daniel Borkmann.
12) Don't call sock_kfree_s() with NULL pointers, this function also has
the side effect of adjusting the socket memory usage. From Cong Wang.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (90 commits)
bna: fix skb->truesize underestimation
net: dsa: add includes for ethtool and phy_fixed definitions
openvswitch: Set flow-key members.
netrom: use linux/uaccess.h
dsa: Fix conversion from host device to mii bus
tipc: fix bug in bundled buffer reception
ipv6: introduce tcp_v6_iif()
sfc: add support for skb->xmit_more
r8152: return -EBUSY for runtime suspend
ipv4: fix a potential use after free in fou.c
ipv4: fix a potential use after free in ip_tunnel_core.c
hyperv: Add handling of IP header with option field in netvsc_set_hash()
openvswitch: Create right mask with disabled megaflows
vxlan: fix a free after use
openvswitch: fix a use after free
ipv4: dst_entry leak in ip_send_unicast_reply()
ipv4: clean up cookie_v4_check()
ipv4: share tcp_v4_save_options() with cookie_v4_check()
ipv4: call __ip_options_echo() in cookie_v4_check()
atm: simplify lanai.c by using module_pci_driver
...
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This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.
Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/percpu
Pull percpu updates from Tejun Heo:
"A lot of activities on percpu front. Notable changes are...
- percpu allocator now can take @gfp. If @gfp doesn't contain
GFP_KERNEL, it tries to allocate from what's already available to
the allocator and a work item tries to keep the reserve around
certain level so that these atomic allocations usually succeed.
This will replace the ad-hoc percpu memory pool used by
blk-throttle and also be used by the planned blkcg support for
writeback IOs.
Please note that I noticed a bug in how @gfp is interpreted while
preparing this pull request and applied the fix 6ae833c7fe0c
("percpu: fix how @gfp is interpreted by the percpu allocator")
just now.
- percpu_ref now uses longs for percpu and global counters instead of
ints. It leads to more sparse packing of the percpu counters on
64bit machines but the overhead should be negligible and this
allows using percpu_ref for refcnting pages and in-memory objects
directly.
- The switching between percpu and single counter modes of a
percpu_ref is made independent of putting the base ref and a
percpu_ref can now optionally be initialized in single or killed
mode. This allows avoiding percpu shutdown latency for cases where
the refcounted objects may be synchronously created and destroyed
in rapid succession with only a fraction of them reaching fully
operational status (SCSI probing does this when combined with
blk-mq support). It's also planned to be used to implement forced
single mode to detect underflow more timely for debugging.
There's a separate branch percpu/for-3.18-consistent-ops which cleans
up the duplicate percpu accessors. That branch causes a number of
conflicts with s390 and other trees. I'll send a separate pull
request w/ resolutions once other branches are merged"
* 'for-3.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/percpu: (33 commits)
percpu: fix how @gfp is interpreted by the percpu allocator
blk-mq, percpu_ref: start q->mq_usage_counter in atomic mode
percpu_ref: make INIT_ATOMIC and switch_to_atomic() sticky
percpu_ref: add PERCPU_REF_INIT_* flags
percpu_ref: decouple switching to percpu mode and reinit
percpu_ref: decouple switching to atomic mode and killing
percpu_ref: add PCPU_REF_DEAD
percpu_ref: rename things to prepare for decoupling percpu/atomic mode switch
percpu_ref: replace pcpu_ prefix with percpu_
percpu_ref: minor code and comment updates
percpu_ref: relocate percpu_ref_reinit()
Revert "blk-mq, percpu_ref: implement a kludge for SCSI blk-mq stall during probe"
Revert "percpu: free percpu allocation info for uniprocessor system"
percpu-refcount: make percpu_ref based on longs instead of ints
percpu-refcount: improve WARN messages
percpu: fix locking regression in the failure path of pcpu_alloc()
percpu-refcount: add @gfp to percpu_ref_init()
proportions: add @gfp to init functions
percpu_counter: add @gfp to percpu_counter_init()
percpu_counter: make percpu_counters_lock irq-safe
...
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