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[ Upstream commit 8680407b6f8f5fba59e8f1d63c869abc280f04df ]
This change ensures that if configured in the policy, the if_id set in
the policy and secpath states match during the inbound policy check.
Without this, there is potential for ambiguity where entries in the
secpath differing by only the if_id could be mismatched.
Notably, this is checked in the outbound direction when resolving
templates to SAs, but not on the inbound path when matching SAs and
policies.
Test: Tested against Android kernel unit tests & CTS
Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6b9831bfd9322b297eb6d44257808cc055fdc586 ]
Christoph reported the mptcp variant of a recently addressed plain
TCP issue. Similar to commit e14cadfd80d7 ("tcp: add annotations around
sk->sk_shutdown accesses") add READ/WRITE ONCE annotations to silence
KCSAN reports around lockless sk_shutdown access.
Fixes: 71ba088ce0aa ("mptcp: cleanup accept and poll")
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/401
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1b1b43ee7a208096ecd79e626f2fc90d4a321111 ]
The first subflow socket is accessed outside the msk socket lock
by mptcp_subflow_fail(), we need to annotate each write access
with WRITE_ONCE, but a few spots still lacks it.
Fixes: 76a13b315709 ("mptcp: invoke MP_FAIL response when needed")
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7e8b88ec35eef363040e08d99536d2bebef83774 ]
When the msk socket is cloned at MPC handshake time, a few
fields are initialized in a racy way outside mptcp_sk_clone()
and the msk socket lock.
The above is due historical reasons: before commit a88d0092b24b
("mptcp: simplify subflow_syn_recv_sock()") as the first subflow socket
carrying all the needed date was not available yet at msk creation
time
We can now refactor the code moving the missing initialization bit
under the socket lock, removing the init race and avoiding some
code duplication.
This will also simplify the next patch, as all msk->first write
access are now under the msk socket lock.
Fixes: 0397c6d85f9c ("mptcp: keep unaccepted MPC subflow into join list")
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a88d0092b24b8cddce57fe0e88e60a9e29e0b515 ]
Postpone the msk cloning to the child process creation
so that we can avoid a bunch of conditionals.
Link: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/61
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 7e8b88ec35ee ("mptcp: consolidate passive msk socket initialization")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2bb9a37f0e194ed95c70603b0efc7898a5a0d9b4 ]
In the syn_recv fallback path, the msk is unused. We can skip
setting the socket address.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 7e8b88ec35ee ("mptcp: consolidate passive msk socket initialization")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5b825727d0871b23e8867f6371183e61628b4a26 ]
The MPTCP can access the first subflow socket in a few spots
outside the socket lock scope. That is actually safe, as MPTCP
will delete the socket itself only after the msk sock close().
Still the such accesses causes a few KCSAN splats, as reported
by Christoph. Silence the harmless warning adding a few annotation
around the relevant accesses.
Fixes: 71ba088ce0aa ("mptcp: cleanup accept and poll")
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/402
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 617612316953093bc859890e405e1b550c27d840 ]
In a few spots, the mptcp code invokes the __mptcp_nmpc_socket() helper
multiple times under the same socket lock scope. Additionally, in such
places, the socket status ensures that there is no MP capable handshake
running.
Under the above condition we can replace the later __mptcp_nmpc_socket()
helper invocation with direct access to the msk->subflow pointer and
better document such access is not supposed to fail with WARN().
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 5b825727d087 ("mptcp: add annotations around msk->subflow accesses")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit b0ad3c179059089d809b477a1d445c1183a7b8fe upstream.
validate_linkmsg() was introduced by commit 1840bb13c22f5b ("[RTNL]:
Validate hardware and broadcast address attribute for RTM_NEWLINK")
to validate tb[IFLA_ADDRESS/BROADCAST] for existing links. The same
check should also be done for newly created links.
This patch adds validate_linkmsg() call in rtnl_create_link(), to
avoid the invalid address set when creating some devices like:
# ip link add dummy0 type dummy
# ip link add link dummy0 name mac0 address 01:02 type macsec
Fixes: 0e06877c6fdb ("[RTNETLINK]: rtnl_link: allow specifying initial device address")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 30c6f0bf9579debce27e45fac34fdc97e46acacc ]
In this patch, we mainly try to handle sending a compressed ack
correctly if it's deferred.
Here are more details in the old logic:
When sack compression is triggered in the tcp_compressed_ack_kick(),
if the sock is owned by user, it will set TCP_DELACK_TIMER_DEFERRED
and then defer to the release cb phrase. Later once user releases
the sock, tcp_delack_timer_handler() should send a ack as expected,
which, however, cannot happen due to lack of ICSK_ACK_TIMER flag.
Therefore, the receiver would not sent an ack until the sender's
retransmission timeout. It definitely increases unnecessary latency.
Fixes: 5d9f4262b7ea ("tcp: add SACK compression")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: fuyuanli <fuyuanli@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230529113804.GA20300@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000/
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230531080150.GA20424@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4d56304e5827c8cc8cc18c75343d283af7c4825c ]
If we send two TCA_FLOWER_KEY_ENC_OPTS_GENEVE packets and their total
size is 252 bytes(key->enc_opts.len = 252) then
key->enc_opts.len = opt->length = data_len / 4 = 0 when the third
TCA_FLOWER_KEY_ENC_OPTS_GENEVE packet enters fl_set_geneve_opt. This
bypasses the next bounds check and results in an out-of-bounds.
Fixes: 0a6e77784f49 ("net/sched: allow flower to match tunnel options")
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230531102805.27090-1-hbh25y@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c034203b6a9dae6751ef4371c18cb77983e30c28 ]
The bug here is that you cannot rely on getting the same socket
from multiple calls to fget() because userspace can influence
that. This is a kind of double fetch bug.
The fix is to delete the svc_alien_sock() function and instead do
the checking inside the svc_addsock() function.
Fixes: 3064639423c4 ("nfsd: check passed socket's net matches NFSd superblock's one")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 448a5ce1120c5bdbce1f1ccdabcd31c7d029f328 ]
Syzkaller got the following report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sk_setup_caps+0x621/0x690 net/core/sock.c:2018
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888027f82780 by task syz-executor276/3255
The function sk_setup_caps (called by ip6_sk_dst_store_flow->
ip6_dst_store) referenced already freed memory as this memory was
freed by parallel task in udpv6_sendmsg->ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow->
sk_dst_check.
task1 (connect) task2 (udp6_sendmsg)
sk_setup_caps->sk_dst_set |
| sk_dst_check->
| sk_dst_set
| dst_release
sk_setup_caps references |
to already freed dst_entry|
The reason for this race condition is: sk_setup_caps() keeps using
the dst after transferring the ownership to the dst cache.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with syzkaller.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Efanov <VEfanov@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f4e4534850a9d18c250a93f8d7fbb51310828110 ]
The current code for the length calculation wrongly truncates the reported
length of the groups array, causing an under report of the subscribed
groups. To fix this, use 'BITS_TO_BYTES()' which rounds up the
division by 8.
Fixes: b42be38b2778 ("netlink: add API to retrieve all group memberships")
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230529153335.389815-1-pctammela@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 36eec020fab668719b541f34d97f44e232ffa165 ]
When use the following command to test:
1)ip link add bond0 type bond
2)ip link set bond0 up
3)tc qdisc add dev bond0 root handle ffff: mq
4)tc qdisc replace dev bond0 parent ffff:fff1 handle ffff: mq
The kernel reports NULL pointer dereference issue. The stack information
is as follows:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mq_attach+0x44/0xa0
lr : qdisc_graft+0x20c/0x5cc
sp : ffff80000e2236a0
x29: ffff80000e2236a0 x28: ffff0000c0e59d80 x27: ffff0000c0be19c0
x26: ffff0000cae3e800 x25: 0000000000000010 x24: 00000000fffffff1
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff0000cae3e800 x21: ffff0000c9df4000
x20: ffff0000c9df4000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffff80000a934000
x17: ffff8000f5b56000 x16: ffff80000bb08000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b x12: 6b6b6b6b00000001
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffff0000c0be0730 x7 : bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb x6 : 0000000000000008
x5 : ffff0000cae3e864 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffff8000090bc23c x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
mq_attach+0x44/0xa0
qdisc_graft+0x20c/0x5cc
tc_modify_qdisc+0x1c4/0x664
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x354/0x440
netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x144
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x34
netlink_unicast+0x1e8/0x2a4
netlink_sendmsg+0x308/0x4a0
sock_sendmsg+0x64/0xac
____sys_sendmsg+0x29c/0x358
___sys_sendmsg+0x90/0xd0
__sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x2c/0x38
invoke_syscall+0x54/0x114
el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x90/0x174
do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xb0
el0_svc+0x24/0xec
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xb4
el0t_64_sync+0x174/0x178
This is because when mq is added for the first time, qdiscs in mq is set
to NULL in mq_attach(). Therefore, when replacing mq after adding mq, we
need to initialize qdiscs in the mq before continuing to graft. Otherwise,
it will couse NULL pointer dereference issue in mq_attach(). And the same
issue will occur in the attach functions of mqprio, taprio and htb.
ffff:fff1 means that the repalce qdisc is ingress. Ingress does not allow
any qdisc to be attached. Therefore, ffff:fff1 is incorrectly used, and
the command should be dropped.
Fixes: 6ec1c69a8f64 ("net_sched: add classful multiqueue dummy scheduler")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230527093747.3583502-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9de95df5d15baa956c2b70b9e794842e790a8a13 ]
Currently, after creating an ingress (or clsact) Qdisc and grafting it
under TC_H_INGRESS (TC_H_CLSACT), it is possible to graft it again under
e.g. a TBF Qdisc:
$ ip link add ifb0 type ifb
$ tc qdisc add dev ifb0 handle 1: root tbf rate 20kbit buffer 1600 limit 3000
$ tc qdisc add dev ifb0 clsact
$ tc qdisc link dev ifb0 handle ffff: parent 1:1
$ tc qdisc show dev ifb0
qdisc tbf 1: root refcnt 2 rate 20Kbit burst 1600b lat 560.0ms
qdisc clsact ffff: parent ffff:fff1 refcnt 2
^^^^^^^^
clsact's refcount has increased: it is now grafted under both
TC_H_CLSACT and 1:1.
ingress and clsact Qdiscs should only be used under TC_H_INGRESS
(TC_H_CLSACT). Prohibit regrafting them.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Fixes: 1f211a1b929c ("net, sched: add clsact qdisc")
Tested-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f85fa45d4a9408d98c46c8fa45ba2e3b2f4bf219 ]
Currently it is possible to add e.g. an HTB Qdisc under ffff:fff1
(TC_H_INGRESS, TC_H_CLSACT):
$ ip link add name ifb0 type ifb
$ tc qdisc add dev ifb0 parent ffff:fff1 htb
$ tc qdisc add dev ifb0 clsact
Error: Exclusivity flag on, cannot modify.
$ drgn
...
>>> ifb0 = netdev_get_by_name(prog, "ifb0")
>>> qdisc = ifb0.ingress_queue.qdisc_sleeping
>>> print(qdisc.ops.id.string_().decode())
htb
>>> qdisc.flags.value_() # TCQ_F_INGRESS
2
Only allow ingress and clsact Qdiscs under ffff:fff1. Return -EINVAL
for everything else. Make TCQ_F_INGRESS a static flag of ingress and
clsact Qdiscs.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Fixes: 1f211a1b929c ("net, sched: add clsact qdisc")
Tested-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5eeebfe6c493192b10d516abfd72742900f2a162 ]
clsact Qdiscs are only supposed to be created under TC_H_CLSACT (which
equals TC_H_INGRESS). Return -EOPNOTSUPP if 'parent' is not
TC_H_CLSACT.
Fixes: 1f211a1b929c ("net, sched: add clsact qdisc")
Tested-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c7cfbd115001f94de9e4053657946a383147e803 ]
ingress Qdiscs are only supposed to be created under TC_H_INGRESS.
Return -EOPNOTSUPP if 'parent' is not TC_H_INGRESS, similar to
mq_init().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+b53a9c0d1ea4ad62da8b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0000000000006cf87705f79acf1a@google.com/
Tested-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 71c6aa0305e3d2365d3bfd0134b4025d9e7ba388 ]
We encountered a crash when using SMCRv2. It is caused by a logical
error in smc_llc_fill_ext_v2().
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 453 Comm: kworker/7:4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W E 6.4.0-rc3+ #44
Workqueue: events smc_llc_add_link_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:smc_llc_fill_ext_v2+0x117/0x280 [smc]
RSP: 0018:ffffacb5c064bd88 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffff9a6bc1c3c02c RBX: ffff9a6be3558000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 000000000000000a
RBP: ffffacb5c064bdb8 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 000000000000000c
R10: ffff9a6bc0910300 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff9a6bc1c3c02c R15: ffff9a6be3558250
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9a6eefdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000014 CR3: 000000010b078003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
smc_llc_send_add_link+0x1ae/0x2f0 [smc]
smc_llc_srv_add_link+0x2c9/0x5a0 [smc]
? cc_mkenc+0x40/0x60
smc_llc_add_link_work+0xb8/0x140 [smc]
process_one_work+0x1e5/0x3f0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x2f0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xe5/0x120
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
</TASK>
When an alernate RNIC is available in system, SMC will try to add a new
link based on the RNIC for resilience. All the RMBs in use will be mapped
to the new link. Then the RMBs' MRs corresponding to the new link will be
filled into SMCRv2 LLC ADD LINK messages.
However, smc_llc_fill_ext_v2() mistakenly accesses to unused RMBs which
haven't been mapped to the new link and have no valid MRs, thus causing
a crash. So this patch fixes the logic.
Fixes: b4ba4652b3f8 ("net/smc: extend LLC layer for SMC-Rv2")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b24aa141c2ff26c919237aee61ea1818fc6780d9 ]
When finding the first RMB of link group, it should start from the
current RMB list whose index is 0. So fix it.
Fixes: b4ba4652b3f8 ("net/smc: extend LLC layer for SMC-Rv2")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 34dfde4ad87b84d21278a7e19d92b5b2c68e6c4d ]
This patch replaces the tp->mss_cache check in getting TCP_MAXSEG
with tp->rx_opt.user_mss check for CLOSE/LISTEN sock. Since
tp->mss_cache is initialized with TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, checking if
it's zero is probably a bug.
With this change, getting TCP_MAXSEG before connecting will return
default MSS normally, and return user_mss if user_mss is set.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Jack Yang <mingliang@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+3kL9pYtkxkwxwNMzvC_w3LNUum_2=3u+UyLBmGmifHA@mail.gmail.com/#t
Signed-off-by: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/14D45862-36EA-4076-974C-EA67513C92F6@linux.alibaba.com/
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230527040317.68247-1-cambda@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4faeee0cf8a5d88d63cdbc3bab124fb0e6aed08c ]
Historically connect(AF_UNSPEC) has been abused by syzkaller
and other fuzzers to trigger various bugs.
A recent one triggers a divide-by-zero [1], and Paolo Abeni
was able to diagnose the issue.
tcp_recvmsg_locked() has tests about sk_state being not TCP_LISTEN
and TCP REPAIR mode being not used.
Then later if socket lock is released in sk_wait_data(),
another thread can call connect(AF_UNSPEC), then make this
socket a TCP listener.
When recvmsg() is resumed, it can eventually call tcp_cleanup_rbuf()
and attempt a divide by 0 in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() [1]
This patch adds a new socket field, counting number of threads
blocked in sk_wait_event() and inet_wait_for_connect().
If this counter is not zero, tcp_disconnect() returns an error.
This patch adds code in blocking socket system calls, thus should
not hurt performance of non blocking ones.
Note that we probably could revert commit 499350a5a6e7 ("tcp:
initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0") to restore
original tcpi_rcv_mss meaning (was 0 if no payload was ever
received on a socket)
[1]
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 13832 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-syzkaller-00224-g00c7b5f4ddc5 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023
RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x36e/0x9d0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:740
Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 64 24 48 8b 44 24 04 44 89 f9 41 81 c7 80 03 00 00 c1 e1 04 44 29 f0 48 63 c9 48 01 e9 48 0f af c1 <49> f7 f6 48 8d 04 41 48 89 44 24 40 48 8b 44 24 30 48 c1 e8 03 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900033af660 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 4a66b76cbade2c48 RBX: ffff888076640cc0 RCX: 00000000c334e4ac
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 00000000c324e86c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880766417f8
R13: ffff888028fbb980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000010344
FS: 00007f5bffbfe700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32f25000 CR3: 000000007ced0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x100e/0x22e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2616
tcp_recvmsg+0x117/0x620 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2681
inet6_recvmsg+0x114/0x640 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:670
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1038
____sys_recvmsg+0x210/0x5a0 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg+0xf2/0x180 net/socket.c:2762
do_recvmmsg+0x25e/0x6e0 net/socket.c:2856
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2935 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2958 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2951 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x20f/0x260 net/socket.c:2951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f5c0108c0f9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f5bffbfe168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5c011ac050 RCX: 00007f5c0108c0f9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f5c010e7b39 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f5c012cfb1f R14: 00007f5bffbfe300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diagnosed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526163458.2880232-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6ffc57ea004234d9373c57b204fd10370a69f392 ]
A recent patch added READ_ONCE() in packet_bind() and packet_bind_spkt()
This is better handled by reading pkt_sk(sk)->num later
in packet_do_bind() while appropriate lock is held.
READ_ONCE() in writers are often an evidence of something being wrong.
Fixes: 822b5a1c17df ("af_packet: Fix data-races of pkt_sk(sk)->num.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526154342.2533026-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8a0d57df8938e9fd2e99d47a85b7f37d86f91097 ]
Most protos' poll() methods insert a memory barrier between
writes to sk_err and sk_error_report(). This dates back to
commit a4d258036ed9 ("tcp: Fix race in tcp_poll").
I guess we should do the same thing in TLS, tcp_poll() does
not hold the socket lock.
Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ("tls: kernel TLS support")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 822b5a1c17df7e338b9f05d1cfe5764e37c7f74f ]
syzkaller found a data race of pkt_sk(sk)->num.
The value is changed under lock_sock() and po->bind_lock, so we
need READ_ONCE() to access pkt_sk(sk)->num without these locks in
packet_bind_spkt(), packet_bind(), and sk_diag_fill().
Note that WRITE_ONCE() is already added by commit c7d2ef5dd4b0
("net/packet: annotate accesses to po->bind").
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_bind / packet_do_bind
write (marked) to 0xffff88802ffd1cee of 2 bytes by task 7322 on cpu 0:
packet_do_bind+0x446/0x640 net/packet/af_packet.c:3236
packet_bind+0x99/0xe0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3321
__sys_bind+0x19b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1803
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1814 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1812 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1812
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
read to 0xffff88802ffd1cee of 2 bytes by task 7318 on cpu 1:
packet_bind+0xbf/0xe0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3322
__sys_bind+0x19b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1803
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1814 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1812 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1812
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
value changed: 0x0300 -> 0x0000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 7318 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.3.0-13380-g7fddb5b5300c #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Fixes: 96ec6327144e ("packet: Diag core and basic socket info dumping")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230524232934.50950-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 31642e7089df8fd3f54ca7843f7ee2952978cad1 ]
Simon Kapadia reported the following issue:
<quote>
The Online Amateur Radio Community (OARC) has recently been experimenting
with building a nationwide packet network in the UK.
As part of our experimentation, we have been testing out packet on 300bps HF,
and playing with net/rom. For HF packet at this baud rate you really need
to make sure that your MTU is relatively low; AX.25 suggests a PACLEN of 60,
and a net/rom PACLEN of 40 to go with that.
However the Linux net/rom support didn't work with a low PACLEN;
the mkiss module would truncate packets if you set the PACLEN below about 200 or so, e.g.:
Apr 19 14:00:51 radio kernel: [12985.747310] mkiss: ax1: truncating oversized transmit packet!
This didn't make any sense to me (if the packets are smaller why would they
be truncated?) so I started investigating.
I looked at the packets using ethereal, and found that many were just huge
compared to what I would expect.
A simple net/rom connection request packet had the request and then a bunch
of what appeared to be random data following it:
</quote>
Simon provided a patch that I slightly revised:
Not only we must not use skb_tailroom(), we also do
not want to count NR_NETWORK_LEN twice.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Co-Developed-by: Simon Kapadia <szymon@kapadia.pl>
Signed-off-by: Simon Kapadia <szymon@kapadia.pl>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Simon Kapadia <szymon@kapadia.pl>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230524141456.1045467-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9b7c68b3911aef84afa4cbfc31bce20f10570d51 upstream.
Currently, offloaded conntrack entries (flows) can only be deleted
after they are removed from offload, which is either by timeout,
tcp state change or tc ct rule deletion. This can cause issues for
users wishing to manually delete or flush existing entries.
Support deletion of offloaded conntrack entries.
Example usage:
# Delete all offloaded (and non offloaded) conntrack entries
# whose source address is 1.2.3.4
$ conntrack -D -s 1.2.3.4
# Delete all entries
$ conntrack -F
Signed-off-by: Paul Blakey <paulb@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 000c2fa2c144c499c881a101819cf1936a1f7cf2 upstream.
Previously, channel open messages were always sent to monitors on the first
ioctl() call for unbound HCI sockets, even if the command and arguments
were completely invalid. This can leave an exploitable hole with the abuse
of invalid ioctl calls.
This commit hardens the ioctl processing logic by first checking if the
command is valid, and immediately returning with an ENOIOCTLCMD error code
if it is not. This ensures that ioctl calls with invalid commands are free
of side effects, and increases the difficulty of further exploitation by
forcing exploitation to find a way to pass a valid command first.
Signed-off-by: Ruihan Li <lrh2000@pku.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dragos-Marian Panait <dragos.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 368d3cb406cdd074d1df2ad9ec06d1bfcb664882 ]
page_pool_ring_[un]lock() use in_softirq() to decide which
spin lock variant to use, and when they are called in the
context with in_softirq() being false, spin_lock_bh() is
called in page_pool_ring_lock() while spin_unlock() is
called in page_pool_ring_unlock(), because spin_lock_bh()
has disabled the softirq in page_pool_ring_lock(), which
causes inconsistency for spin lock pair calling.
This patch fixes it by returning in_softirq state from
page_pool_producer_lock(), and use it to decide which
spin lock variant to use in page_pool_producer_unlock().
As pool->ring has both producer and consumer lock, so
rename it to page_pool_producer_[un]lock() to reflect
the actual usage. Also move them to page_pool.c as they
are only used there, and remove the 'inline' as the
compiler may have better idea to do inlining or not.
Fixes: 7886244736a4 ("net: page_pool: Add bulk support for ptr_ring")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230522031714.5089-1-linyunsheng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 542bcea4be866b14b3a5c8e90773329066656c43 ]
We use BH context only for synchronization, so we don't care if it's
actually serving softirq or not.
As a side node, in case of threaded NAPI, in_serving_softirq() will
return false because it's in process context with BH off, making
page_pool_recycle_in_cache() unreachable.
Signed-off-by: Qingfang DENG <qingfang.deng@siflower.com.cn>
Tested-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 368d3cb406cd ("page_pool: fix inconsistency for page_pool_ring_[un]lock()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e5c6de5fa025882babf89cecbed80acf49b987fa ]
The read_skb() logic is incrementing the tcp->copied_seq which is used for
among other things calculating how many outstanding bytes can be read by
the application. This results in application errors, if the application
does an ioctl(FIONREAD) we return zero because this is calculated from
the copied_seq value.
To fix this we move tcp->copied_seq accounting into the recv handler so
that we update these when the recvmsg() hook is called and data is in
fact copied into user buffers. This gives an accurate FIONREAD value
as expected and improves ACK handling. Before we were calling the
tcp_rcv_space_adjust() which would update 'number of bytes copied to
user in last RTT' which is wrong for programs returning SK_PASS. The
bytes are only copied to the user when recvmsg is handled.
Doing the fix for recvmsg is straightforward, but fixing redirect and
SK_DROP pkts is a bit tricker. Build a tcp_psock_eat() helper and then
call this from skmsg handlers. This fixes another issue where a broken
socket with a BPF program doing a resubmit could hang the receiver. This
happened because although read_skb() consumed the skb through sock_drop()
it did not update the copied_seq. Now if a single reccv socket is
redirecting to many sockets (for example for lb) the receiver sk will be
hung even though we might expect it to continue. The hang comes from
not updating the copied_seq numbers and memory pressure resulting from
that.
We have a slight layer problem of calling tcp_eat_skb even if its not
a TCP socket. To fix we could refactor and create per type receiver
handlers. I decided this is more work than we want in the fix and we
already have some small tweaks depending on caller that use the
helper skb_bpf_strparser(). So we extend that a bit and always set
the strparser bit when it is in use and then we can gate the
seq_copied updates on this.
Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-9-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6df7f764cd3cf5a03a4a47b23be47e57e41fcd85 ]
When TCP stack has data ready to read sk_data_ready() is called. Sockmap
overwrites this with its own handler to call into BPF verdict program.
But, the original TCP socket had sock_def_readable that would additionally
wake up any user space waiters with sk_wake_async().
Sockmap saved the callback when the socket was created so call the saved
data ready callback and then we can wake up any epoll() logic waiting
on the read.
Note we call on 'copied >= 0' to account for returning 0 when a FIN is
received because we need to wake up user for this as well so they
can do the recvmsg() -> 0 and detect the shutdown.
Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-8-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ea444185a6bf7da4dd0df1598ee953e4f7174858 ]
A common mechanism to put a TCP socket into the sockmap is to hook the
BPF_SOCK_OPS_{ACTIVE_PASSIVE}_ESTABLISHED_CB event with a BPF program
that can map the socket info to the correct BPF verdict parser. When
the user adds the socket to the map the psock is created and the new
ops are assigned to ensure the verdict program will 'see' the sk_buffs
as they arrive.
Part of this process hooks the sk_data_ready op with a BPF specific
handler to wake up the BPF verdict program when data is ready to read.
The logic is simple enough (posted here for easy reading)
static void sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
{
struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->ops || !sock->ops->read_skb))
return;
sock->ops->read_skb(sk, sk_psock_verdict_recv);
}
The oversight here is sk->sk_socket is not assigned until the application
accepts() the new socket. However, its entirely ok for the peer application
to do a connect() followed immediately by sends. The socket on the receiver
is sitting on the backlog queue of the listening socket until its accepted
and the data is queued up. If the peer never accepts the socket or is slow
it will eventually hit data limits and rate limit the session. But,
important for BPF sockmap hooks when this data is received TCP stack does
the sk_data_ready() call but the read_skb() for this data is never called
because sk_socket is missing. The data sits on the sk_receive_queue.
Then once the socket is accepted if we never receive more data from the
peer there will be no further sk_data_ready calls and all the data
is still on the sk_receive_queue(). Then user calls recvmsg after accept()
and for TCP sockets in sockmap we use the tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser() handler.
The handler checks for data in the sk_msg ingress queue expecting that
the BPF program has already run from the sk_data_ready hook and enqueued
the data as needed. So we are stuck.
To fix do an unlikely check in recvmsg handler for data on the
sk_receive_queue and if it exists wake up data_ready. We have the sock
locked in both read_skb and recvmsg so should avoid having multiple
runners.
Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-7-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 901546fd8f9ca4b5c481ce00928ab425ce9aacc0 ]
The sockmap code is returning EAGAIN after a FIN packet is received and no
more data is on the receive queue. Correct behavior is to return 0 to the
user and the user can then close the socket. The EAGAIN causes many apps
to retry which masks the problem. Eventually the socket is evicted from
the sockmap because its released from sockmap sock free handling. The
issue creates a delay and can cause some errors on application side.
To fix this check on sk_msg_recvmsg side if length is zero and FIN flag
is set then set return to zero. A selftest will be added to check this
condition.
Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-6-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 405df89dd52cbcd69a3cd7d9a10d64de38f854b2 ]
We noticed some rare sk_buffs were stepping past the queue when system was
under memory pressure. The general theory is to skip enqueueing
sk_buffs when its not necessary which is the normal case with a system
that is properly provisioned for the task, no memory pressure and enough
cpu assigned.
But, if we can't allocate memory due to an ENOMEM error when enqueueing
the sk_buff into the sockmap receive queue we push it onto a delayed
workqueue to retry later. When a new sk_buff is received we then check
if that queue is empty. However, there is a problem with simply checking
the queue length. When a sk_buff is being processed from the ingress queue
but not yet on the sockmap msg receive queue its possible to also recv
a sk_buff through normal path. It will check the ingress queue which is
zero and then skip ahead of the pkt being processed.
Previously we used sock lock from both contexts which made the problem
harder to hit, but not impossible.
To fix instead of popping the skb from the queue entirely we peek the
skb from the queue and do the copy there. This ensures checks to the
queue length are non-zero while skb is being processed. Then finally
when the entire skb has been copied to user space queue or another
socket we pop it off the queue. This way the queue length check allows
bypassing the queue only after the list has been completely processed.
To reproduce issue we run NGINX compliance test with sockmap running and
observe some flakes in our testing that we attributed to this issue.
Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-5-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit bce22552f92ea7c577f49839b8e8f7d29afaf880 ]
Now that the backlog manages the reschedule() logic correctly we can drop
the partial fix to reschedule from recvmsg hook.
Rescheduling on recvmsg hook was added to address a corner case where we
still had data in the backlog state but had nothing to kick it and
reschedule the backlog worker to run and finish copying data out of the
state. This had a couple limitations, first it required user space to
kick it introducing an unnecessary EBUSY and retry. Second it only
handled the ingress case and egress redirects would still be hung.
With the correct fix, pushing the reschedule logic down to where the
enomem error occurs we can drop this fix.
Fixes: bec217197b412 ("skmsg: Schedule psock work if the cached skb exists on the psock")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-4-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 29173d07f79883ac94f5570294f98af3d4287382 ]
Sk_buffs are fed into sockmap verdict programs either from a strparser
(when the user might want to decide how framing of skb is done by attaching
another parser program) or directly through tcp_read_sock. The
tcp_read_sock is the preferred method for performance when the BPF logic is
a stream parser.
The flow for Cilium's common use case with a stream parser is,
tcp_read_sock()
sk_psock_verdict_recv
ret = bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu()
sk_psock_verdict_apply(sock, skb, ret)
// if system is under memory pressure or app is slow we may
// need to queue skb. Do this queuing through ingress_skb and
// then kick timer to wake up handler
skb_queue_tail(ingress_skb, skb)
schedule_work(work);
The work queue is wired up to sk_psock_backlog(). This will then walk the
ingress_skb skb list that holds our sk_buffs that could not be handled,
but should be OK to run at some later point. However, its possible that
the workqueue doing this work still hits an error when sending the skb.
When this happens the skbuff is requeued on a temporary 'state' struct
kept with the workqueue. This is necessary because its possible to
partially send an skbuff before hitting an error and we need to know how
and where to restart when the workqueue runs next.
Now for the trouble, we don't rekick the workqueue. This can cause a
stall where the skbuff we just cached on the state variable might never
be sent. This happens when its the last packet in a flow and no further
packets come along that would cause the system to kick the workqueue from
that side.
To fix we could do simple schedule_work(), but while under memory pressure
it makes sense to back off some instead of continue to retry repeatedly. So
instead to fix convert schedule_work to schedule_delayed_work and add
backoff logic to reschedule from backlog queue on errors. Its not obvious
though what a good backoff is so use '1'.
To test we observed some flakes whil running NGINX compliance test with
sockmap we attributed these failed test to this bug and subsequent issue.
>From on list discussion. This commit
bec217197b41("skmsg: Schedule psock work if the cached skb exists on the psock")
was intended to address similar race, but had a couple cases it missed.
Most obvious it only accounted for receiving traffic on the local socket
so if redirecting into another socket we could still get an sk_buff stuck
here. Next it missed the case where copied=0 in the recv() handler and
then we wouldn't kick the scheduler. Also its sub-optimal to require
userspace to kick the internal mechanisms of sockmap to wake it up and
copy data to user. It results in an extra syscall and requires the app
to actual handle the EAGAIN correctly.
Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-3-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 78fa0d61d97a728d306b0c23d353c0e340756437 ]
The read_skb hook calls consume_skb() now, but this means that if the
recv_actor program wants to use the skb it needs to inc the ref cnt
so that the consume_skb() doesn't kfree the sk_buff.
This is problematic because in some error cases under memory pressure
we may need to linearize the sk_buff from sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue().
Then we get this,
skb_linearize()
__pskb_pull_tail()
pskb_expand_head()
BUG_ON(skb_shared(skb))
Because we incremented users refcnt from sk_psock_verdict_recv() we
hit the bug on with refcnt > 1 and trip it.
To fix lets simply pass ownership of the sk_buff through the skb_read
call. Then we can drop the consume from read_skb handlers and assume
the verdict recv does any required kfree.
Bug found while testing in our CI which runs in VMs that hit memory
constraints rather regularly. William tested TCP read_skb handlers.
[ 106.536188] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 106.536197] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1693!
[ 106.536479] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 106.536726] CPU: 3 PID: 1495 Comm: curl Not tainted 5.19.0-rc5 #1
[ 106.537023] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.16.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 106.537467] RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0x269/0x330
[ 106.538585] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000138b68 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 106.538839] RAX: 000000000000003f RBX: ffff8881048940e8 RCX: 0000000000000a20
[ 106.539186] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8881048940e8
[ 106.539529] RBP: ffffc90000138be8 R08: 00000000e161fd1a R09: 0000000000000000
[ 106.539877] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881048940e8
[ 106.540222] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881048940e8
[ 106.540568] FS: 00007f277dde9f00(0000) GS:ffff88813bd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 106.540954] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 106.541227] CR2: 00007f277eeede64 CR3: 000000000ad3e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 106.541569] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 106.541915] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 106.542255] Call Trace:
[ 106.542383] <IRQ>
[ 106.542487] __pskb_pull_tail+0x4b/0x3e0
[ 106.542681] skb_ensure_writable+0x85/0xa0
[ 106.542882] sk_skb_pull_data+0x18/0x20
[ 106.543084] bpf_prog_b517a65a242018b0_bpf_skskb_http_verdict+0x3a9/0x4aa9
[ 106.543536] ? migrate_disable+0x66/0x80
[ 106.543871] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0xe2/0x310
[ 106.544258] ? sk_psock_write_space+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 106.544561] tcp_read_skb+0x7b/0x120
[ 106.544740] tcp_data_queue+0x904/0xee0
[ 106.544931] tcp_rcv_established+0x212/0x7c0
[ 106.545142] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x174/0x2a0
[ 106.545326] tcp_v4_rcv+0xe70/0xf60
[ 106.545500] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x48/0x290
[ 106.545744] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa7/0x150
Fixes: 04919bed948dc ("tcp: Introduce tcp_read_skb()")
Reported-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: William Findlay <will@isovalent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230523025618.113937-2-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit eca9bfafee3a0487e59c59201ae14c7594ba940a ]
When receive buffer is small we try to copy out the data from
TCP into a skb maintained by TLS to prevent connection from
stalling. Unfortunately if a single record is made up of a mix
of decrypted and non-decrypted skbs combining them into a single
skb leads to loss of decryption status, resulting in decryption
errors or data corruption.
Similarly when trying to use TCP receive queue directly we need
to make sure that all the skbs within the record have the same
status. If we don't the mixed status will be detected correctly
but we'll CoW the anchor, again collapsing it into a single paged
skb without decrypted status preserved. So the "fixup" code will
not know which parts of skb to re-encrypt.
Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Tested-by: Shai Amiram <samiram@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c1c607b1e5d5477d82ca6a86a05a4f10907b33ee ]
We'll need to copy input skbs individually in the next patch.
Factor that code out (without assuming we're copying a full record).
Tested-by: Shai Amiram <samiram@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: eca9bfafee3a ("tls: rx: strp: preserve decryption status of skbs when needed")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 14c4be92ebb3e36e392aa9dd8f314038a9f96f3c ]
If a record is partially decrypted we'll have to CoW it, anyway,
so go into copy mode and allocate a writable skb right away.
This will make subsequent fix simpler because we won't have to
teach tls_strp_msg_make_copy() how to copy skbs while preserving
decrypt status.
Tested-by: Shai Amiram <samiram@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: eca9bfafee3a ("tls: rx: strp: preserve decryption status of skbs when needed")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8b0c0dc9fbbd01e58a573a41c38885f9e4c17696 ]
We call tls_rx_msg_size(skb) before doing skb->len += chunk.
So the tls_rx_msg_size() code will see old skb->len, most
likely leading to an over-read.
Worst case we will over read an entire record, next iteration
will try to trim the skb but may end up turning frag len negative
or discarding the subsequent record (since we already told TCP
we've read it during previous read but now we'll trim it out of
the skb).
Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Tested-by: Shai Amiram <samiram@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 210620ae44a83f25220450bbfcc22e6fe986b25f ]
alloc_skb_with_frags() fills in page frag sizes but does not
set skb->len and skb->data_len. Set those correctly otherwise
device offload will most likely generate an empty skb and
hit the BUG() at the end of __skb_nsg().
Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Tested-by: Shai Amiram <samiram@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b3a03b540e3cf62a255213d084d76d71c02793d5 ]
skb->len covers the entire skb, including the frag_list.
In fact we're guaranteed that rxm->full_len <= skb->len,
so since the change under Fixes we were not checking decrypt
status of any skb but the first.
Note that the skb_pagelen() added here may feel a bit costly,
but it's removed by subsequent fixes, anyway.
Reported-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Fixes: 86b259f6f888 ("tls: rx: device: bound the frag walk")
Tested-by: Shai Amiram <samiram@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3632679d9e4f879f49949bb5b050e0de553e4739 ]
With a raw socket bound to IPPROTO_RAW (ie with hdrincl enabled), the
protocol field of the flow structure, build by raw_sendmsg() /
rawv6_sendmsg()), is set to IPPROTO_RAW. This breaks the ipsec policy
lookup when some policies are defined with a protocol in the selector.
For ipv6, the sin6_port field from 'struct sockaddr_in6' could be used to
specify the protocol. Just accept all values for IPPROTO_RAW socket.
For ipv4, the sin_port field of 'struct sockaddr_in' could not be used
without breaking backward compatibility (the value of this field was never
checked). Let's add a new kind of control message, so that the userland
could specify which protocol is used.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230522120820.1319391-1-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 91d0b78c5177f3e42a4d8738af8ac19c3a90d002 ]
Users who want to share a single public IP address for outgoing connections
between several hosts traditionally reach for SNAT. However, SNAT requires
state keeping on the node(s) performing the NAT.
A stateless alternative exists, where a single IP address used for egress
can be shared between several hosts by partitioning the available ephemeral
port range. In such a setup:
1. Each host gets assigned a disjoint range of ephemeral ports.
2. Applications open connections from the host-assigned port range.
3. Return traffic gets routed to the host based on both, the destination IP
and the destination port.
An application which wants to open an outgoing connection (connect) from a
given port range today can choose between two solutions:
1. Manually pick the source port by bind()'ing to it before connect()'ing
the socket.
This approach has a couple of downsides:
a) Search for a free port has to be implemented in the user-space. If
the chosen 4-tuple happens to be busy, the application needs to retry
from a different local port number.
Detecting if 4-tuple is busy can be either easy (TCP) or hard
(UDP). In TCP case, the application simply has to check if connect()
returned an error (EADDRNOTAVAIL). That is assuming that the local
port sharing was enabled (REUSEADDR) by all the sockets.
# Assume desired local port range is 60_000-60_511
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
s.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.bind(("192.0.2.1", 60_000))
s.connect(("1.1.1.1", 53))
# Fails only if 192.0.2.1:60000 -> 1.1.1.1:53 is busy
# Application must retry with another local port
In case of UDP, the network stack allows binding more than one socket
to the same 4-tuple, when local port sharing is enabled
(REUSEADDR). Hence detecting the conflict is much harder and involves
querying sock_diag and toggling the REUSEADDR flag [1].
b) For TCP, bind()-ing to a port within the ephemeral port range means
that no connecting sockets, that is those which leave it to the
network stack to find a free local port at connect() time, can use
the this port.
IOW, the bind hash bucket tb->fastreuse will be 0 or 1, and the port
will be skipped during the free port search at connect() time.
2. Isolate the app in a dedicated netns and use the use the per-netns
ip_local_port_range sysctl to adjust the ephemeral port range bounds.
The per-netns setting affects all sockets, so this approach can be used
only if:
- there is just one egress IP address, or
- the desired egress port range is the same for all egress IP addresses
used by the application.
For TCP, this approach avoids the downsides of (1). Free port search and
4-tuple conflict detection is done by the network stack:
system("sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range='60000 60511'")
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
s.setsockopt(SOL_IP, IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT, 1)
s.bind(("192.0.2.1", 0))
s.connect(("1.1.1.1", 53))
# Fails if all 4-tuples 192.0.2.1:60000-60511 -> 1.1.1.1:53 are busy
For UDP this approach has limited applicability. Setting the
IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT socket option does not result in local source
port being shared with other connected UDP sockets.
Hence relying on the network stack to find a free source port, limits the
number of outgoing UDP flows from a single IP address down to the number
of available ephemeral ports.
To put it another way, partitioning the ephemeral port range between hosts
using the existing Linux networking API is cumbersome.
To address this use case, add a new socket option at the SOL_IP level,
named IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE. The new option can be used to clamp down the
ephemeral port range for each socket individually.
The option can be used only to narrow down the per-netns local port
range. If the per-socket range lies outside of the per-netns range, the
latter takes precedence.
UAPI-wise, the low and high range bounds are passed to the kernel as a pair
of u16 values in host byte order packed into a u32. This avoids pointer
passing.
PORT_LO = 40_000
PORT_HI = 40_511
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
v = struct.pack("I", PORT_HI << 16 | PORT_LO)
s.setsockopt(SOL_IP, IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE, v)
s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
s.getsockname()
# Local address between ("127.0.0.1", 40_000) and ("127.0.0.1", 40_511),
# if there is a free port. EADDRINUSE otherwise.
[1] https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflare-blog/blob/232b432c1d57/2022-02-connectx/connectx.py#L116
Reviewed-by: Marek Majkowski <marek@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 3632679d9e4f ("ipv{4,6}/raw: fix output xfrm lookup wrt protocol")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 35112271672ae98f45df7875244a4e33aa215e31 upstream.
We found a crash when using SMCRv2 with 2 Mellanox ConnectX-4. It
can be reproduced by:
- smc_run nginx
- smc_run wrk -t 32 -c 500 -d 30 http://<ip>:<port>
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 8000000108713067 P4D 8000000108713067 PUD 151127067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 4 PID: 2441 Comm: kworker/4:249 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W E 6.4.0-rc1+ #42
Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:smc_clc_send_confirm_accept+0x284/0x580 [smc]
RSP: 0018:ffffb8294b2d7c78 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: ffff8f1873238880 RBX: ffffb8294b2d7dc8 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000000000b4 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000b40c00
RBP: ffffb8294b2d7db8 R08: ffff8f1815c5860c R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8f1846f56180
R13: ffff8f1815c5860c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f1aefd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000014 CR3: 00000001027a0001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? mlx5_ib_map_mr_sg+0xa1/0xd0 [mlx5_ib]
? smcr_buf_map_link+0x24b/0x290 [smc]
? __smc_buf_create+0x4ee/0x9b0 [smc]
smc_clc_send_accept+0x4c/0xb0 [smc]
smc_listen_work+0x346/0x650 [smc]
? __schedule+0x279/0x820
process_one_work+0x1e5/0x3f0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x2f0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xe5/0x120
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
</TASK>
During the CLC handshake, server sequentially tries available SMCRv2
and SMCRv1 devices in smc_listen_work().
If an SMCRv2 device is found. SMCv2 based link group and link will be
assigned to the connection. Then assumed that some buffer assignment
errors happen later in the CLC handshake, such as RMB registration
failure, server will give up SMCRv2 and try SMCRv1 device instead. But
the resources assigned to the connection won't be reset.
When server tries SMCRv1 device, the connection creation process will
be executed again. Since conn->lnk has been assigned when trying SMCRv2,
it will not be set to the correct SMCRv1 link in
smcr_lgr_conn_assign_link(). So in such situation, conn->lgr points to
correct SMCRv1 link group but conn->lnk points to the SMCRv2 link
mistakenly.
Then in smc_clc_send_confirm_accept(), conn->rmb_desc->mr[link->link_idx]
will be accessed. Since the link->link_idx is not correct, the related
MR may not have been initialized, so crash happens.
| Try SMCRv2 device first
| |-> conn->lgr: assign existed SMCRv2 link group;
| |-> conn->link: assign existed SMCRv2 link (link_idx may be 1 in SMC_LGR_SYMMETRIC);
| |-> sndbuf & RMB creation fails, quit;
|
| Try SMCRv1 device then
| |-> conn->lgr: create SMCRv1 link group and assign;
| |-> conn->link: keep SMCRv2 link mistakenly;
| |-> sndbuf & RMB creation succeed, only RMB->mr[link_idx = 0]
| initialized.
|
| Then smc_clc_send_confirm_accept() accesses
| conn->rmb_desc->mr[conn->link->link_idx, which is 1], then crash.
v
This patch tries to fix this by cleaning conn->lnk before assigning
link. In addition, it is better to reset the connection and clean the
resources assigned if trying SMCRv2 failed in buffer creation or
registration.
Fixes: e49300a6bf62 ("net/smc: add listen processing for SMC-Rv2")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220523055056.2078994-1-liuyacan@corp.netease.com/
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 6ca328e985cd995dfd1d5de44046e6074f853fbb upstream.
When doing plpmtu probe, the probe size is growing every time when it
receives the ACK during the Search state until the probe fails. When
the failure occurs, pl.probe_high is set and it goes to the Complete
state.
However, if the link pmtu is huge, like 65535 in loopback_dev, the probe
eventually keeps using SCTP_MAX_PLPMTU as the probe size and never fails.
Because of that, pl.probe_high can not be set, and the plpmtu probe can
never go to the Complete state.
Fix it by setting pl.probe_high to SCTP_MAX_PLPMTU when the probe size
grows to SCTP_MAX_PLPMTU in sctp_transport_pl_recv(). Also, not allow
the probe size greater than SCTP_MAX_PLPMTU in the Complete state.
Fixes: b87641aff9e7 ("sctp: do state transition when a probe succeeds on HB ACK recv path")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 878ecb0897f4737a4c9401f3523fd49589025671 upstream.
optlen is fetched without checking whether there is more than one byte to parse.
It can lead to out-of-bounds access.
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: c61a40432509 ("[IPV6]: Find option offset by type.")
Signed-off-by: Gavrilov Ilia <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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