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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features:
- add base infrastructure for socket mediation. ABI bump and
additional checks to ensure only v8 compliant policy uses socket af
mediation.
- improve and cleanup dfa verification
- improve profile attachment logic
- improve overlapping expression handling
- add the xattr matching to the attachment logic
- improve signal mediation handling with stacked labels
- improve handling of no_new_privs in a label stack
Cleanups and changes:
- use dfa to parse string split
- bounded version of label_parse
- proper line wrap nulldfa.in
- split context out into task and cred naming to better match usage
- simplify code in aafs
Bug fixes:
- fix display of .ns_name for containers
- fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
- fix logging of the existence test for signals
- fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
- fix display of .ns_name for containers
- fix an error code in verify_table_headers()
- fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path
- fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-04-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (36 commits)
apparmor: fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path
apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement
apparmor: Fix an error code in verify_table_headers()
apparmor: fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t
apparmor: update MAINTAINERS file git and wiki locations
apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE
apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution
apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matching
apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value
apparmor: cleanup: simplify code to get ns symlink name
apparmor: cleanup create_aafs() error path
apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers
apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding
apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro
apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnp
apparmor: move context.h to cred.h
apparmor: move task related defines and fns to task.X files
apparmor: cleanup, drop unused fn __aa_task_is_confined()
apparmor: cleanup fixup description of aa_replace_profiles
...
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There is a permission discrepancy when consulting msq ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/msg (0444) and the MSG_STAT shmctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the msq metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new MSG_STAT_ANY command such that the msq ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "sysvipc: introduce STAT_ANY commands", v2.
The following patches adds the discussed (see [1]) new command for shm
as well as for sems and msq as they are subject to the same
discrepancies for ipc object permission checks between the syscall and
via procfs. These new commands are justified in that (1) we are stuck
with this semantics as changing syscall and procfs can break userland;
and (2) some users can benefit from performance (for large amounts of
shm segments, for example) from not having to parse the procfs
interface.
Once merged, I will submit the necesary manpage updates. But I'm thinking
something like:
: diff --git a/man2/shmctl.2 b/man2/shmctl.2
: index 7bb503999941..bb00bbe21a57 100644
: --- a/man2/shmctl.2
: +++ b/man2/shmctl.2
: @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
: .\" 2005-04-25, mtk -- noted aberrant Linux behavior w.r.t. new
: .\" attaches to a segment that has already been marked for deletion.
: .\" 2005-08-02, mtk: Added IPC_INFO, SHM_INFO, SHM_STAT descriptions.
: +.\" 2018-02-13, dbueso: Added SHM_STAT_ANY description.
: .\"
: .TH SHMCTL 2 2017-09-15 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
: .SH NAME
: @@ -242,6 +243,18 @@ However, the
: argument is not a segment identifier, but instead an index into
: the kernel's internal array that maintains information about
: all shared memory segments on the system.
: +.TP
: +.BR SHM_STAT_ANY " (Linux-specific)"
: +Return a
: +.I shmid_ds
: +structure as for
: +.BR SHM_STAT .
: +However, the
: +.I shm_perm.mode
: +is not checked for read access for
: +.IR shmid ,
: +resembing the behaviour of
: +/proc/sysvipc/shm.
: .PP
: The caller can prevent or allow swapping of a shared
: memory segment with the following \fIcmd\fP values:
: @@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ operation returns the index of the highest used entry in the
: kernel's internal array recording information about all
: shared memory segments.
: (This information can be used with repeated
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operations to obtain information about all shared memory segments
: on the system.)
: A successful
: @@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ isn't accessible.
: \fIshmid\fP is not a valid identifier, or \fIcmd\fP
: is not a valid command.
: Or: for a
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operation, the index value specified in
: .I shmid
: referred to an array slot that is currently unused.
This patch (of 3):
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata
between /proc/sysvipc/shm (0444) and the SHM_STAT shmctl command. The
later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO. As such there can
be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed
anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the shm metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all
the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so
we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the
procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs). Some
applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and
can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some
reported cases.
This patch introduces a new SHM_STAT_ANY command such that the shm ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/220
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing updates from Steven Rostedt:
"New features:
- Tom Zanussi's extended histogram work.
This adds the synthetic events to have histograms from multiple
event data Adds triggers "onmatch" and "onmax" to call the
synthetic events Several updates to the histogram code from this
- Allow way to nest ring buffer calls in the same context
- Allow absolute time stamps in ring buffer
- Rewrite of filter code parsing based on Al Viro's suggestions
- Setting of trace_clock to global if TSC is unstable (on boot)
- Better OOM handling when allocating large ring buffers
- Added initcall tracepoints (consolidated initcall_debug code with
them)
And other various fixes and clean ups"
* tag 'trace-v4.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace: (68 commits)
init: Have initcall_debug still work without CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS
init, tracing: Have printk come through the trace events for initcall_debug
init, tracing: instrument security and console initcall trace events
init, tracing: Add initcall trace events
tracing: Add rcu dereference annotation for test func that touches filter->prog
tracing: Add rcu dereference annotation for filter->prog
tracing: Fixup logic inversion on setting trace_global_clock defaults
tracing: Hide global trace clock from lockdep
ring-buffer: Add set/clear_current_oom_origin() during allocations
ring-buffer: Check if memory is available before allocation
lockdep: Add print_irqtrace_events() to __warn
vsprintf: Do not preprocess non-dereferenced pointers for bprintf (%px and %pK)
tracing: Uninitialized variable in create_tracing_map_fields()
tracing: Make sure variable string fields are NULL-terminated
tracing: Add action comparisons when testing matching hist triggers
tracing: Don't add flag strings when displaying variable references
tracing: Fix display of hist trigger expressions containing timestamps
ftrace: Drop a VLA in module_exists()
tracing: Mention trace_clock=global when warning about unstable clocks
tracing: Default to using trace_global_clock if sched_clock is unstable
...
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Commit 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state") triggers a BUG
when SELinux is runtime-disabled (i.e. systemd or equivalent disables
SELinux before initial policy load via /sys/fs/selinux/disable based on
/etc/selinux/config SELINUX=disabled).
This does not manifest if SELinux is disabled via kernel command line
argument or if SELinux is enabled (permissive or enforcing).
Before:
SELinux: Disabled at runtime.
BUG: Dentry 000000006d77e5c7{i=17,n=null} still in use (1) [unmount of selinuxfs selinuxfs]
After:
SELinux: Disabled at runtime.
Fixes: 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"A mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and continues to close
IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps.
Also note the addition of a new cred_getsecid LSM hook by Matthew
Garrett:
For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid
in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a
cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible.
which is used by a new CREDS_CHECK target in IMA:
In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process
credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new
process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the
system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets -
BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did
previously"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm
ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list
evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing
ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()
integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS
ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface
evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]
evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c
fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
ima: fail signature verification based on policy
ima: clear IMA_HASH
ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull smack update from James Morris:
"One small change for Automotive Grade Linux"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Handle CGROUP2 in the same way that CGROUP
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security layer updates from James Morris:
- Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving
about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon.
- Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and
security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred),
from Stephen Smalley.
- Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file
unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: convert security hooks to use hlist
exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A bigger than usual pull request for SELinux, 13 patches (lucky!)
along with a scary looking diffstat.
Although if you look a bit closer, excluding the usual minor
tweaks/fixes, there are really only two significant changes in this
pull request: the addition of proper SELinux access controls for SCTP
and the encapsulation of a lot of internal SELinux state.
The SCTP changes are the result of a multi-month effort (maybe even a
year or longer?) between the SELinux folks and the SCTP folks to add
proper SELinux controls. A special thanks go to Richard for seeing
this through and keeping the effort moving forward.
The state encapsulation work is a bit of janitorial work that came out
of some early work on SELinux namespacing. The question of namespacing
is still an open one, but I believe there is some real value in the
encapsulation work so we've split that out and are now sending that up
to you"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: wrap AVC state
selinux: wrap selinuxfs state
selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in get_bools/classes
selinux: Update SELinux SCTP documentation
selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure
selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functions
selinux: wrap global selinux state
selinux: fix typo in selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone declaration
selinux: Add SCTP support
sctp: Add LSM hooks
sctp: Add ip option support
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks
netlabel: If PF_INET6, check sk_buff ip header version
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Merge updates from Andrew Morton:
- a few misc things
- ocfs2 updates
- the v9fs maintainers have been missing for a long time. I've taken
over v9fs patch slinging.
- most of MM
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (116 commits)
mm,oom_reaper: check for MMF_OOM_SKIP before complaining
mm/ksm: fix interaction with THP
mm/memblock.c: cast constant ULLONG_MAX to phys_addr_t
headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.h
include/linux/mmdebug.h: make VM_WARN* non-rvals
mm/page_isolation.c: make start_isolate_page_range() fail if already isolated
mm: change return type to vm_fault_t
mm, oom: remove 3% bonus for CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes
mm, page_alloc: wakeup kcompactd even if kswapd cannot free more memory
kernel/fork.c: detect early free of a live mm
mm: make counting of list_lru_one::nr_items lockless
mm/swap_state.c: make bool enable_vma_readahead and swap_vma_readahead() static
block_invalidatepage(): only release page if the full page was invalidated
mm: kernel-doc: add missing parameter descriptions
mm/swap.c: remove @cold parameter description for release_pages()
mm/nommu: remove description of alloc_vm_area
zram: drop max_zpage_size and use zs_huge_class_size()
zsmalloc: introduce zs_huge_class_size()
mm: fix races between swapoff and flush dcache
fs/direct-io.c: minor cleanups in do_blockdev_direct_IO
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted stuff, including Christoph's I_DIRTY patches"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: move I_DIRTY_INODE to fs.h
ubifs: fix bogus __mark_inode_dirty(I_DIRTY_SYNC | I_DIRTY_DATASYNC) call
ntfs: fix bogus __mark_inode_dirty(I_DIRTY_SYNC | I_DIRTY_DATASYNC) call
gfs2: fix bogus __mark_inode_dirty(I_DIRTY_SYNC | I_DIRTY_DATASYNC) calls
fs: fold open_check_o_direct into do_dentry_open
vfs: Replace stray non-ASCII homoglyph characters with their ASCII equivalents
vfs: make sure struct filename->iname is word-aligned
get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.h
[poll] annotate SAA6588_CMD_POLL users
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Trace events have been added around the initcall functions defined in
init/main.c. But console and security have their own initcalls. This adds
the trace events associated for those initcall functions.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1521765208.19745.2.camel@polymtl.ca
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Abderrahmane Benbachir <abderrahmane.benbachir@polymtl.ca>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious
reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source
files that do not use it.
This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig. It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes. I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.
Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms. Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).
[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
combine all of those. ]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> [2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There was a lot of work this cycle fixing bugs that were discovered
after the merge window and getting everything ready where we can
reasonably support fully unprivileged fuse. The bug fixes you already
have and much of the unprivileged fuse work is coming in via other
trees.
Still left for fully unprivileged fuse is figuring out how to cleanly
handle .set_acl and .get_acl in the legacy case, and properly handling
of evm xattrs on unprivileged mounts.
Included in the tree is a cleanup from Alexely that replaced a linked
list with a statically allocated fix sized array for the pid caches,
which simplifies and speeds things up.
Then there is are some cleanups and fixes for the ipc namespace. The
motivation was that in reviewing other code it was discovered that
access ipc objects from different pid namespaces recorded pids in such
a way that when asked the wrong pids were returned. In the worst case
there has been a measured 30% performance impact for sysvipc
semaphores. Other test cases showed no measurable performance impact.
Manfred Spraul and Davidlohr Bueso who tend to work on sysvipc
performance both gave the nod that this is good enough.
Casey Schaufler and James Morris have given their approval to the LSM
side of the changes.
I simplified the types and the code dealing with sysvipc to pass just
kern_ipc_perm for all three types of ipc. Which reduced the header
dependencies throughout the kernel and simplified the lsm code.
Which let me work on the pid fixes without having to worry about
trivial changes causing complete kernel recompiles"
* 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
ipc/shm: Fix pid freeing.
ipc/shm: fix up for struct file no longer being available in shm.h
ipc/smack: Tidy up from the change in type of the ipc security hooks
ipc: Directly call the security hook in ipc_ops.associate
ipc/sem: Fix semctl(..., GETPID, ...) between pid namespaces
ipc/msg: Fix msgctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces
ipc/shm: Fix shmctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces.
ipc/util: Helpers for making the sysvipc operations pid namespace aware
ipc: Move IPCMNI from include/ipc.h into ipc/util.h
msg: Move struct msg_queue into ipc/msg.c
shm: Move struct shmid_kernel into ipc/shm.c
sem: Move struct sem and struct sem_array into ipc/sem.c
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks
shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks
sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks
pidns: simpler allocation of pid_* caches
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Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2018-03-31
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Add raw BPF tracepoint API in order to have a BPF program type that
can access kernel internal arguments of the tracepoints in their
raw form similar to kprobes based BPF programs. This infrastructure
also adds a new BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN command to BPF syscall which
returns an anon-inode backed fd for the tracepoint object that allows
for automatic detach of the BPF program resp. unregistering of the
tracepoint probe on fd release, from Alexei.
2) Add new BPF cgroup hooks at bind() and connect() entry in order to
allow BPF programs to reject, inspect or modify user space passed
struct sockaddr, and as well a hook at post bind time once the port
has been allocated. They are used in FB's container management engine
for implementing policy, replacing fragile LD_PRELOAD wrapper
intercepting bind() and connect() calls that only works in limited
scenarios like glibc based apps but not for other runtimes in
containerized applications, from Andrey.
3) BPF_F_INGRESS flag support has been added to sockmap programs for
their redirect helper call bringing it in line with cls_bpf based
programs. Support is added for both variants of sockmap programs,
meaning for tx ULP hooks as well as recv skb hooks, from John.
4) Various improvements on BPF side for the nfp driver, besides others
this work adds BPF map update and delete helper call support from
the datapath, JITing of 32 and 64 bit XADD instructions as well as
offload support of bpf_get_prandom_u32() call. Initial implementation
of nfp packet cache has been tackled that optimizes memory access
(see merge commit for further details), from Jakub and Jiong.
5) Removal of struct bpf_verifier_env argument from the print_bpf_insn()
API has been done in order to prepare to use print_bpf_insn() soon
out of perf tool directly. This makes the print_bpf_insn() API more
generic and pushes the env into private data. bpftool is adjusted
as well with the print_bpf_insn() argument removal, from Jiri.
6) Couple of cleanups and prep work for the upcoming BTF (BPF Type
Format). The latter will reuse the current BPF verifier log as
well, thus bpf_verifier_log() is further generalized, from Martin.
7) For bpf_getsockopt() and bpf_setsockopt() helpers, IPv4 IP_TOS read
and write support has been added in similar fashion to existing
IPv6 IPV6_TCLASS socket option we already have, from Nikita.
8) Fixes in recent sockmap scatterlist API usage, which did not use
sg_init_table() for initialization thus triggering a BUG_ON() in
scatterlist API when CONFIG_DEBUG_SG was enabled. This adds and
uses a small helper sg_init_marker() to properly handle the affected
cases, from Prashant.
9) Let the BPF core follow IDR code convention and therefore use the
idr_preload() and idr_preload_end() helpers, which would also help
idr_alloc_cyclic() under GFP_ATOMIC to better succeed under memory
pressure, from Shaohua.
10) Last but not least, a spelling fix in an error message for the
BPF cookie UID helper under BPF sample code, from Colin.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently on the error exit path the allocated buffer is not free'd
causing a memory leak. Fix this by kfree'ing it.
Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1466876 ("Resource leaks")
Fixes: 1180b4c757aa ("apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of
the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down
the size of the struct by about half.
In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the
callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term
purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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rt_genid_bump_all() consists of ipv4 and ipv6 part.
ipv4 part is incrementing of net::ipv4::rt_genid,
and I see many places, where it's read without rtnl_lock().
ipv6 part calls __fib6_clean_all(), and it's also
called without rtnl_lock() in other places.
So, rtnl_lock() here was used to iterate net_namespace_list only,
and we can remove it.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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rtnl_lock() is used everywhere, and contention is very high.
When someone wants to iterate over alive net namespaces,
he/she has no a possibility to do that without exclusive lock.
But the exclusive rtnl_lock() in such places is overkill,
and it just increases the contention. Yes, there is already
for_each_net_rcu() in kernel, but it requires rcu_read_lock(),
and this can't be sleepable. Also, sometimes it may be need
really prevent net_namespace_list growth, so for_each_net_rcu()
is not fit there.
This patch introduces new rw_semaphore, which will be used
instead of rtnl_mutex to protect net_namespace_list. It is
sleepable and allows not-exclusive iterations over net
namespaces list. It allows to stop using rtnl_lock()
in several places (what is made in next patches) and makes
less the time, we keep rtnl_mutex. Here we just add new lock,
while the explanation of we can remove rtnl_lock() there are
in next patches.
Fine grained locks generally are better, then one big lock,
so let's do that with net_namespace_list, while the situation
allows that.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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move COUNT_ARGS() macro from apparmor to generic header and extend it
to count till twelve.
COUNT() was an alternative name for this logic, but it's used for
different purpose in many other places.
Similarly for CONCATENATE() macro.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Rename the variables shp, sma, msq to isp. As that is how the code already
refers to those variables.
Collapse smack_of_shm, smack_of_sem, and smack_of_msq into smack_of_ipc,
as the three functions had become completely identical.
Collapse smack_shm_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security and
smack_msg_queue_alloc_security into smack_ipc_alloc_security as the three
functions had become identical.
Collapse smack_shm_free_security, smack_sem_free_security and
smack_msg_queue_free_security into smack_ipc_free_security as the
three functions had become identical.
Requested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Synchronous pernet_operations are not allowed anymore.
All are asynchronous. So, drop the structure member.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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next-smack
Pull request from Casey.
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IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's
early use. The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be
compiled-in.
The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When
the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA
initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls
ima_post_path_mknod()). Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use
the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm.
Fixed crash:
$ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m
[ 0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4
...
[ 1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2)
...
[ 2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390
[ 2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4
[ 2.613080] Supported: Yes
[ 2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1
[ 2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[ 2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000
[ 2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390
[ 2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296
[ 2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004
[ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728
[ 2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f
[ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000
[ 2.613080] FS: 00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2.613080] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
[ 2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 2.613080] Call Trace:
[ 2.613080] ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0
[ 2.613080] ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40
[ 2.613080] SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220
[ 2.613080] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
[ 2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570
[ 2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085
[ 2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570
[ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f
[ 2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000
[ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660
[ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002
[ 2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 <4c> 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20
[ 2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88
[ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]---
[ 2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009
[ 2.673052]
[ 2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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|
This is required to use SMACK and IMA/EVM together. Add it to the
default nomeasure/noappraise list like other pseudo filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Martin Townsend <mtownsend1973@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
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EVM might update the evm xattr while the VFS performs a remount to
readonly mode. This is not properly checked for, additionally check
the s_readonly_remount superblock flag before writing.
The bug can for example be observed with UBIFS. UBIFS checks the free
space on the device before and after a remount. With EVM enabled the
free space sometimes differs between both checks.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
Replace nested ifs in the EVM xattr verification logic with a switch
statement, making the code easier to understand.
Also, add comments to the if statements in the out section and constify the
cause variable.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
|
|
The "goto out" statement doesn't have any purpose since there's no cleanup
to be done when returning early, so remove it. This also makes the rc
variable unnecessary so remove it as well.
Also, the xattr_len and fmt variables are redundant so remove them as well.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
This macro isn't used anymore since commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce
own integrity cache lock"), so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
In keeping with the directive to get rid of VLAs [1], let's drop the VLA
from ima_audit_measurement(). We need to adjust the return type of
ima_audit_measurement, because now this function can fail if an allocation
fails.
[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
v2: just use audit_log_format instead of doing a second allocation
v3: ignore failures in ima_audit_measurement()
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support. If it is built as a
module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init. tpm_pcr_read() in
IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually
there is a TPM chip on the system.
ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19)
Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel
and initializes before IMA.
Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
When policy replacement occurs the symlinks in the profile directory
need to be updated to point to the new rawdata, otherwise once the
old rawdata is removed the symlink becomes broken.
Fix this by dynamically generating the symlink everytime it is read.
These links are used enough that their value needs to be cached and
this way we can avoid needing locking to read and update the link
value.
Fixes: a481f4d917835 ("apparmor: add custom apparmorfs that will be used by policy namespace files")
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1755563
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
We accidentally return a positive EPROTO instead of a negative -EPROTO.
Since 71 is not an error pointer, that means it eventually results in an
Oops in the caller.
Fixes: d901d6a298dc ("apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Currently variable size is a unsigned size_t, hence comparisons to
see if it is less than zero (for error checking) will always be
false. Fix this by making size a ssize_t
Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1466080 ("Unsigned compared against 0")
Fixes: 8e51f9087f40 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
There is no gain from doing this except for some self-documenting.
Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
These variables are not used where they are was defined. There is no
point in declaring them there as extern. Move and constify them, saving
2 bytes.
Function old new delta
init_desc 273 271 -2
Total: Before=2112094, After=2112092, chg -0.00%
Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar>
Tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in
environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the
signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for example
using a pre-built kernel.
This patch defines a new builtin policy named "fail_securely", which can
be specified on the boot command line as an argument to "ima_policy=".
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
The IMA_APPRAISE and IMA_HASH policies overlap. Clear IMA_HASH properly.
Fixes: da1b0029f527 ("ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in a "secure"
environment, with a correctly enforced security policy, which is willing
to assume the inherent risk of specific fuse filesystems that are well
defined and properly implemented.
As there is no way for the kernel to detect file changes, the kernel
ignores the cached file integrity results and re-measures, re-appraises,
and re-audits the file.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
FUSE can be mounted by unprivileged users either today with fusermount
installed with setuid, or soon with the upcoming patches to allow FUSE
mounts in a non-init user namespace.
This patch addresses the new unprivileged non-init mounted filesystems,
which are untrusted, by failing the signature verification.
This patch defines two new flags SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE and
SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
credentials that it did previously.
After this patch, an IMA policy rule along the lines of:
measure func=CREDS_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t
will trigger if a process is executed and runs as unconfined_t, ignoring
the context of the parent process. This is in contrast to:
measure func=BPRM_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t
which will trigger if the process that calls exec() is already executing
in unconfined_t, ignoring the context that the child process executes
into.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changelog:
- initialize ima_creds_status
|
|
For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the
bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid
hook that makes this possible.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
|
|
All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only
access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by
passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue.
Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to
ipc/msg.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only
access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel..
Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only
access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array.
Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array
to become private to ipc/sem.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
Merge to Linux 4.16-rc6 at the request of Jarkko, for his TPM updates.
|
|
Wrap the AVC state within the selinux_state structure and
pass it explicitly to all AVC functions. The AVC private state
is encapsulated in a selinux_avc structure that is referenced
from the selinux_state.
This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or
APIs (userspace or LSM).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Move global selinuxfs state to a per-instance structure (selinux_fs_info),
and include a pointer to the selinux_state in this structure.
Pass this selinux_state to all security server operations, thereby
ensuring that each selinuxfs instance presents a view of and acts
as an interface to a particular selinux_state instance.
This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM). It merely wraps the selinuxfs global state,
links it to a particular selinux_state (currently always the single
global selinux_state) and uses that state for all operations.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
If security_get_bools/classes are called before the selinux state is
initialized (i.e. before first policy load), then they should just
return immediately with no booleans/classes.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
