From 4ab25ac8b2b5514151d5f91cf9514df08dd26938 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Weinberger Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2020 22:52:33 +0100 Subject: ubifs: Fix ubifs_tnc_lookup() usage in do_kill_orphans() Orphans are allowed to point to deleted inodes. So -ENOENT is not a fatal error. Reported-by: Кочетков Максим Reported-and-tested-by: "Christian Berger" Tested-by: Karl Olsen Tested-by: Jef Driesen Fixes: ee1438ce5dc4 ("ubifs: Check link count of inodes when killing orphans.") Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger --- fs/ubifs/orphan.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/ubifs') diff --git a/fs/ubifs/orphan.c b/fs/ubifs/orphan.c index edf43ddd7dce..7dd740e3692d 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/orphan.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/orphan.c @@ -688,14 +688,14 @@ static int do_kill_orphans(struct ubifs_info *c, struct ubifs_scan_leb *sleb, ino_key_init(c, &key1, inum); err = ubifs_tnc_lookup(c, &key1, ino); - if (err) + if (err && err != -ENOENT) goto out_free; /* * Check whether an inode can really get deleted. * linkat() with O_TMPFILE allows rebirth of an inode. */ - if (ino->nlink == 0) { + if (err == 0 && ino->nlink == 0) { dbg_rcvry("deleting orphaned inode %lu", (unsigned long)inum); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 81423c78551654953d746250f1721300b470be0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhihao Cheng Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2020 17:40:22 +0800 Subject: ubifs: ubifs_jnl_write_inode: Fix a memory leak bug When inodes with extended attributes are evicted, xent is not freed in one exit branch. Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng Fixes: 9ca2d732644484488db3112 ("ubifs: Limit number of xattrs per inode") Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger --- fs/ubifs/journal.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'fs/ubifs') diff --git a/fs/ubifs/journal.c b/fs/ubifs/journal.c index 3bf8b1fda9d7..e5ec1afe1c66 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/journal.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/journal.c @@ -905,6 +905,7 @@ int ubifs_jnl_write_inode(struct ubifs_info *c, const struct inode *inode) ubifs_err(c, "dead directory entry '%s', error %d", xent->name, err); ubifs_ro_mode(c, err); + kfree(xent); goto out_release; } ubifs_assert(c, ubifs_inode(xino)->xattr); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 927cc5cec35f01fe4f8af0ba80830a90b0533983 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhihao Cheng Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2020 17:40:23 +0800 Subject: ubifs: ubifs_add_orphan: Fix a memory leak bug Memory leak occurs when files with extended attributes are added to orphan list. Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng Fixes: 988bec41318f3fa897e2f8 ("ubifs: orphan: Handle xattrs like files") Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger --- fs/ubifs/orphan.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/ubifs') diff --git a/fs/ubifs/orphan.c b/fs/ubifs/orphan.c index 7dd740e3692d..283f9eb48410 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/orphan.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/orphan.c @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ int ubifs_add_orphan(struct ubifs_info *c, ino_t inum) int err = 0; ino_t xattr_inum; union ubifs_key key; - struct ubifs_dent_node *xent; + struct ubifs_dent_node *xent, *pxent = NULL; struct fscrypt_name nm = {0}; struct ubifs_orphan *xattr_orphan; struct ubifs_orphan *orphan; @@ -181,11 +181,16 @@ int ubifs_add_orphan(struct ubifs_info *c, ino_t inum) xattr_inum = le64_to_cpu(xent->inum); xattr_orphan = orphan_add(c, xattr_inum, orphan); - if (IS_ERR(xattr_orphan)) + if (IS_ERR(xattr_orphan)) { + kfree(xent); return PTR_ERR(xattr_orphan); + } + kfree(pxent); + pxent = xent; key_read(c, &xent->key, &key); } + kfree(pxent); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From acc5af3efa303d5f36cc8c0f61716161f6ca1384 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liu Song Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 23:36:07 +0800 Subject: ubifs: Fix out-of-bounds memory access caused by abnormal value of node_len In “ubifs_check_node”, when the value of "node_len" is abnormal, the code will goto label of "out_len" for execution. Then, in the following "ubifs_dump_node", if inode type is "UBIFS_DATA_NODE", in "print_hex_dump", an out-of-bounds access may occur due to the wrong "ch->len". Therefore, when the value of "node_len" is abnormal, data length should to be adjusted to a reasonable safe range. At this time, structured data is not credible, so dump the corrupted data directly for analysis. Signed-off-by: Liu Song Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger --- fs/ubifs/io.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/ubifs') diff --git a/fs/ubifs/io.c b/fs/ubifs/io.c index 8ceb51478800..7e4bfaf2871f 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/io.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/io.c @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int ubifs_is_mapped(const struct ubifs_info *c, int lnum) int ubifs_check_node(const struct ubifs_info *c, const void *buf, int lnum, int offs, int quiet, int must_chk_crc) { - int err = -EINVAL, type, node_len; + int err = -EINVAL, type, node_len, dump_node = 1; uint32_t crc, node_crc, magic; const struct ubifs_ch *ch = buf; @@ -278,10 +278,22 @@ int ubifs_check_node(const struct ubifs_info *c, const void *buf, int lnum, out_len: if (!quiet) ubifs_err(c, "bad node length %d", node_len); + if (type == UBIFS_DATA_NODE && node_len > UBIFS_DATA_NODE_SZ) + dump_node = 0; out: if (!quiet) { ubifs_err(c, "bad node at LEB %d:%d", lnum, offs); - ubifs_dump_node(c, buf); + if (dump_node) { + ubifs_dump_node(c, buf); + } else { + int safe_len = min3(node_len, c->leb_size - offs, + (int)UBIFS_MAX_DATA_NODE_SZ); + pr_err("\tprevent out-of-bounds memory access\n"); + pr_err("\ttruncated data node length %d\n", safe_len); + pr_err("\tcorrupted data node:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "\t", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 32, 1, + buf, safe_len, 0); + } dump_stack(); } return err; -- cgit v1.2.3