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authorEric Biggers2019-01-06 18:47:42 -0800
committerHerbert Xu2019-01-18 18:40:24 +0800
commitba7d7433a0e998c902132bd47330e355a1eaa894 (patch)
tree173b444702f5d2114d687711b3376477dbbde26b /crypto/ahash.c
parent6b476662b09c393936e0f62c97ad9988d410fd36 (diff)
crypto: hash - set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails
Some algorithms have a ->setkey() method that is not atomic, in the sense that setting a key can fail after changes were already made to the tfm context. In this case, if a key was already set the tfm can end up in a state that corresponds to neither the old key nor the new key. It's not feasible to make all ->setkey() methods atomic, especially ones that have to key multiple sub-tfms. Therefore, make the crypto API set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY if ->setkey() fails and the algorithm requires a key, to prevent the tfm from being used until a new key is set. Note: we can't set CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY for OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, so ->setkey() for those must nevertheless be atomic. That's fine for now since only the crc32 and crc32c algorithms set OPTIONAL_KEY, and it's not intended that OPTIONAL_KEY be used much. [Cc stable mainly because when introducing the NEED_KEY flag I changed AF_ALG to rely on it; and unlike in-kernel crypto API users, AF_ALG previously didn't have this problem. So these "incompletely keyed" states became theoretically accessible via AF_ALG -- though, the opportunities for causing real mischief seem pretty limited.] Fixes: 9fa68f620041 ("crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/ahash.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/ahash.c28
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ahash.c b/crypto/ahash.c
index 5d320a811f75..ca0d3e281fef 100644
--- a/crypto/ahash.c
+++ b/crypto/ahash.c
@@ -190,6 +190,21 @@ static int ahash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
return ret;
}
+static int ahash_nosetkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
+static void ahash_set_needkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
+{
+ const struct hash_alg_common *alg = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm);
+
+ if (tfm->setkey != ahash_nosetkey &&
+ !(alg->base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY))
+ crypto_ahash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
+}
+
int crypto_ahash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
@@ -201,20 +216,16 @@ int crypto_ahash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
else
err = tfm->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
- if (err)
+ if (unlikely(err)) {
+ ahash_set_needkey(tfm);
return err;
+ }
crypto_ahash_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_ahash_setkey);
-static int ahash_nosetkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen)
-{
- return -ENOSYS;
-}
-
static inline unsigned int ahash_align_buffer_size(unsigned len,
unsigned long mask)
{
@@ -489,8 +500,7 @@ static int crypto_ahash_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
if (alg->setkey) {
hash->setkey = alg->setkey;
- if (!(alg->halg.base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY))
- crypto_ahash_set_flags(hash, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
+ ahash_set_needkey(hash);
}
return 0;