Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

Pull vfs pile (part one) from Al Viro:
 "Assorted stuff - cleaning namei.c up a bit, fixing ->d_name/->d_parent
  locking violations, etc.

  The most visible changes here are death of FS_REVAL_DOT (replaced with
  "has ->d_weak_revalidate()") and a new helper getting from struct file
  to inode.  Some bits of preparation to xattr method interface changes.

  Misc patches by various people sent this cycle *and* ocfs2 fixes from
  several cycles ago that should've been upstream right then.

  PS: the next vfs pile will be xattr stuff."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (46 commits)
  saner proc_get_inode() calling conventions
  proc: avoid extra pde_put() in proc_fill_super()
  fs: change return values from -EACCES to -EPERM
  fs/exec.c: make bprm_mm_init() static
  ocfs2/dlm: use GFP_ATOMIC inside a spin_lock
  ocfs2: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
  ocfs2: Fix oops in ocfs2_fast_symlink_readpage() code path
  get_empty_filp()/alloc_file() leave both ->f_pos and ->f_version zero
  target: writev() on single-element vector is pointless
  export kernel_write(), convert open-coded instances
  fs: encode_fh: return FILEID_INVALID if invalid fid_type
  kill f_vfsmnt
  vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op
  nfsd: handle vfs_getattr errors in acl protocol
  switch vfs_getattr() to struct path
  default SET_PERSONALITY() in linux/elf.h
  ceph: prepopulate inodes only when request is aborted
  d_hash_and_lookup(): export, switch open-coded instances
  9p: switch v9fs_set_create_acl() to inode+fid, do it before d_instantiate()
  9p: split dropping the acls from v9fs_set_create_acl()
  ...

11 files changed, 32 insertions, 42 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 60f0c76a27d3..859abdaac1ea 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -349,8 +349,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	unsigned int state;
 	struct file_perms perms = {};
 	struct path_cond cond = {
-		bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
-		bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid,
+		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
 	};
 	const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
 	int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index cd21ec5b90af..fdaa50cb1876 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -449,8 +449,8 @@ int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
 		 u32 request)
 {
 	struct path_cond cond = {
-		.uid = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
-		.mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+		.uid = file_inode(file)->i_uid,
+		.mode = file_inode(file)->i_mode
 	};
 
 	return aa_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8c2a7f6b35e2..b21830eced41 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	int error = 0;
 
-	if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
+	if (!mediated_filesystem(file_inode(file)))
 		return 0;
 
 	/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
-		struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+		struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 		struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
 
 		error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
 	BUG_ON(!fprofile);
 
 	if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
-	    !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
+	    !mediated_filesystem(file_inode(file)))
 		return 0;
 
 	profile = __aa_current_profile();
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 7ee08c756d6b..c44b6fe6648e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
 	if (!file_caps_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
 		return 0;
 
 	dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index d9030b29d84d..1c03e8f1e0e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -140,12 +140,12 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
 
 	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
-		u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
+		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
 		iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
 		result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	int violation = 0;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index b691e0f3830c..a02e0791cf15 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 		file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
 		read = 1;
 	}
-	i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
+	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
 	while (offset < i_size) {
 		int rbuf_len;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 5b14a0946d6e..3b3b7e6bf8da 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  */
 void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 
 	if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 			       int mask, int function)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ef26e9611ffb..84b591711eec 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1528,7 +1528,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			 u32 av)
 {
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
@@ -2929,7 +2929,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 
 	/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
@@ -2941,7 +2941,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
 	fsec = file->f_security;
-	isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+	isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
 	/*
 	 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
 	 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 3a6e8731646c..ff427733c290 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 {
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
-	ino_t ino = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
 	int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
 		security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown();
 
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
 
 static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	ino_t ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	ino_t ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
 	char *data;
 	ssize_t rv;
 
@@ -1042,8 +1042,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t length;
 	ssize_t ret;
 	int cur_enforcing;
-	struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-	unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
 	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 
 	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
@@ -1077,8 +1076,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
 	int new_value;
-	struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-	unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
 	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 
 	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
@@ -1486,13 +1484,11 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	struct inode *inode;
 	char *con;
 	u32 sid, len;
 	ssize_t ret;
 
-	inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-	sid = inode->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
+	sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
 	ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
@@ -1553,7 +1549,7 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
 static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
 	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
@@ -1567,7 +1563,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
 static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
 	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
@@ -1584,7 +1580,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	int value;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
-	unsigned long i_ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
 
 	value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 38be92ce901e..fa64740abb59 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
  */
 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
 	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	int rc;
@@ -1187,21 +1187,15 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	char *msmack;
 	char *osmack;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
-	struct dentry *dp;
 	int may;
 	int mmay;
 	int tmay;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
-		return 0;
-
-	dp = file->f_dentry;
-
-	if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
+	if (file == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-	isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
+	isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
 	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
 		return 0;
 	msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
@@ -1359,7 +1353,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct inode_smack *isp = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+	struct inode_smack *isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
 
 	file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
index 8592f2fc6ebb..fcf32783b66b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static const struct file_operations tomoyo_self_operations = {
  */
 static int tomoyo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-	const int key = ((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private)
+	const int key = ((u8 *) file_inode(file)->i_private)
 		- ((u8 *) NULL);
 	return tomoyo_open_control(key, file);
 }