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-rw-r--r--MAINTAINERS13
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c6
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c87
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h15
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c73
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c59
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c5
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c6
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h4
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.c73
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c193
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c79
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/audit.c2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c4
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.h2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/util.c39
17 files changed, 385 insertions, 279 deletions
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 779fa6dde58b..026644adfd8f 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -5219,8 +5219,7 @@ F: fs/ext4/
Extended Verification Module (EVM)
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-L: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
-L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: security/integrity/evm/
@@ -6847,9 +6846,7 @@ L: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
M: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
-L: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
-L: linux-ima-user@lists.sourceforge.net
-L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
S: Supported
F: security/integrity/ima/
@@ -7632,8 +7629,7 @@ F: kernel/kexec*
KEYS-ENCRYPTED
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
-L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -7641,9 +7637,8 @@ F: include/keys/encrypted-type.h
F: security/keys/encrypted-keys/
KEYS-TRUSTED
-M: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
index 610638a80383..461bf0b8a094 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
@@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return -EFAULT;
}
+ if (in_size < 6 ||
+ in_size < be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (priv->data_buffer + 2)))) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
/* atomic tpm command send and result receive. We only hold the ops
* lock during this period so that the tpm can be unregistered even if
* the char dev is held open.
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index 86f38d239476..83a77a445538 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -20,44 +20,48 @@
#include <linux/device.h>
#include "tpm.h"
-#define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
+struct tpm_readpubek_out {
+ u8 algorithm[4];
+ u8 encscheme[2];
+ u8 sigscheme[2];
+ __be32 paramsize;
+ u8 parameters[12];
+ __be32 keysize;
+ u8 modulus[256];
+ u8 checksum[20];
+} __packed;
+
#define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE (28 + 256)
#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK 124
-static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
- .tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND),
- .length = cpu_to_be32(30),
- .ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_READPUBEK)
-};
+
static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
- u8 *data;
- struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
- ssize_t err;
- int i, rc;
+ struct tpm_buf tpm_buf;
+ struct tpm_readpubek_out *out;
+ ssize_t rc;
+ int i;
char *str = buf;
struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
+ char anti_replay[20];
- memset(&tpm_cmd, 0, sizeof(tpm_cmd));
-
- tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
- READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE, 0,
- "attempting to read the PUBEK");
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- /*
- ignore header 10 bytes
- algorithm 32 bits (1 == RSA )
- encscheme 16 bits
- sigscheme 16 bits
- parameters (RSA 12->bytes: keybit, #primes, expbit)
- keylenbytes 32 bits
- 256 byte modulus
- ignore checksum 20 bytes
- */
- data = tpm_cmd.params.readpubek_out_buffer;
+ memset(&anti_replay, 0, sizeof(anti_replay));
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&tpm_buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_READPUBEK);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tpm_buf_append(&tpm_buf, anti_replay, sizeof(anti_replay));
+
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, tpm_buf.data, PAGE_SIZE,
+ READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE, 0,
+ "attempting to read the PUBEK");
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tpm_buf);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ out = (struct tpm_readpubek_out *)&tpm_buf.data[10];
str +=
sprintf(str,
"Algorithm: %02X %02X %02X %02X\n"
@@ -68,21 +72,26 @@ static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
"%02X %02X %02X %02X\n"
"Modulus length: %d\n"
"Modulus:\n",
- data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3],
- data[4], data[5],
- data[6], data[7],
- data[12], data[13], data[14], data[15],
- data[16], data[17], data[18], data[19],
- data[20], data[21], data[22], data[23],
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + 24))));
+ out->algorithm[0], out->algorithm[1], out->algorithm[2],
+ out->algorithm[3],
+ out->encscheme[0], out->encscheme[1],
+ out->sigscheme[0], out->sigscheme[1],
+ out->parameters[0], out->parameters[1],
+ out->parameters[2], out->parameters[3],
+ out->parameters[4], out->parameters[5],
+ out->parameters[6], out->parameters[7],
+ out->parameters[8], out->parameters[9],
+ out->parameters[10], out->parameters[11],
+ be32_to_cpu(out->keysize));
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
- str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", data[i + 28]);
+ str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", out->modulus[i]);
if ((i + 1) % 16 == 0)
str += sprintf(str, "\n");
}
-out:
+
rc = str - buf;
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&tpm_buf);
return rc;
}
static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(pubek);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 2d5466a72e40..528cffbd49d3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -345,17 +345,6 @@ enum tpm_sub_capabilities {
TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = 0x120,
};
-struct tpm_readpubek_params_out {
- u8 algorithm[4];
- u8 encscheme[2];
- u8 sigscheme[2];
- __be32 paramsize;
- u8 parameters[12]; /*assuming RSA*/
- __be32 keysize;
- u8 modulus[256];
- u8 checksum[20];
-} __packed;
-
typedef union {
struct tpm_input_header in;
struct tpm_output_header out;
@@ -385,8 +374,6 @@ struct tpm_getrandom_in {
} __packed;
typedef union {
- struct tpm_readpubek_params_out readpubek_out;
- u8 readpubek_out_buffer[sizeof(struct tpm_readpubek_params_out)];
struct tpm_pcrread_in pcrread_in;
struct tpm_pcrread_out pcrread_out;
struct tpm_getrandom_in getrandom_in;
@@ -557,7 +544,7 @@ static inline void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
#endif
-static inline inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc)
+static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc)
{
return (rc & BIT(7)) ? rc & 0xff : rc;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index e1a41b788f08..f40d20671a78 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -834,72 +834,43 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm2_selftest_header = {
};
/**
- * tpm2_continue_selftest() - start a self test
- *
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- * @full: test all commands instead of testing only those that were not
- * previously tested.
- *
- * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd with exception of RC_TESTING.
- */
-static int tpm2_start_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool full)
-{
- int rc;
- struct tpm2_cmd cmd;
-
- cmd.header.in = tpm2_selftest_header;
- cmd.params.selftest_in.full_test = full;
-
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE, 0, 0,
- "continue selftest");
-
- /* At least some prototype chips seem to give RC_TESTING error
- * immediately. This is a workaround for that.
- */
- if (rc == TPM2_RC_TESTING) {
- dev_warn(&chip->dev, "Got RC_TESTING, ignoring\n");
- rc = 0;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * tpm2_do_selftest() - run a full self test
+ * tpm2_do_selftest() - ensure that all self tests have passed
*
* @chip: TPM chip to use
*
* Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd.
*
- * During the self test TPM2 commands return with the error code RC_TESTING.
- * Waiting is done by issuing PCR read until it executes successfully.
+ * The TPM can either run all self tests synchronously and then return
+ * RC_SUCCESS once all tests were successful. Or it can choose to run the tests
+ * asynchronously and return RC_TESTING immediately while the self tests still
+ * execute in the background. This function handles both cases and waits until
+ * all tests have completed.
*/
static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
int rc;
- unsigned int loops;
- unsigned int delay_msec = 100;
- unsigned long duration;
- int i;
-
- duration = tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST);
+ unsigned int delay_msec = 20;
+ long duration;
+ struct tpm2_cmd cmd;
- loops = jiffies_to_msecs(duration) / delay_msec;
+ duration = jiffies_to_msecs(
+ tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST));
- rc = tpm2_start_selftest(chip, true);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ while (duration > 0) {
+ cmd.header.in = tpm2_selftest_header;
+ cmd.params.selftest_in.full_test = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < loops; i++) {
- /* Attempt to read a PCR value */
- rc = tpm2_pcr_read(chip, 0, NULL);
- if (rc < 0)
- break;
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE,
+ 0, 0, "continue selftest");
if (rc != TPM2_RC_TESTING)
break;
tpm_msleep(delay_msec);
+ duration -= delay_msec;
+
+ /* wait longer the next round */
+ delay_msec *= 2;
}
return rc;
@@ -1009,7 +980,7 @@ static int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 nr_commands;
- u32 *attrs;
+ __be32 *attrs;
u32 cc;
int i;
int rc;
@@ -1049,7 +1020,7 @@ static int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
chip->nr_commands = nr_commands;
- attrs = (u32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9];
+ attrs = (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9];
for (i = 0; i < nr_commands; i++, attrs++) {
chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] = be32_to_cpup(attrs);
cc = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] & 0xFFFF;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
index e2e059d8ffec..4e4014eabdb9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int tpm2_map_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *cmd)
struct tpm_space *space = &chip->work_space;
unsigned int nr_handles;
u32 attrs;
- u32 *handle;
+ __be32 *handle;
int i;
i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc);
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static int tpm2_map_command(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc, u8 *cmd)
attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i];
nr_handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
- handle = (u32 *)&cmd[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ handle = (__be32 *)&cmd[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
for (i = 0; i < nr_handles; i++, handle++) {
if ((be32_to_cpu(*handle) & 0xFF000000) == TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT) {
if (!tpm2_map_to_phandle(space, handle))
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
index 8f0a98dea327..7b3c2a8aa9de 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
@@ -92,14 +92,9 @@ enum crb_status {
CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE = BIT(0),
};
-enum crb_flags {
- CRB_FL_ACPI_START = BIT(0),
- CRB_FL_CRB_START = BIT(1),
- CRB_FL_CRB_SMC_START = BIT(2),
-};
-
struct crb_priv {
- unsigned int flags;
+ u32 sm;
+ const char *hid;
void __iomem *iobase;
struct crb_regs_head __iomem *regs_h;
struct crb_regs_tail __iomem *regs_t;
@@ -128,14 +123,16 @@ struct tpm2_crb_smc {
* Anyhow, we do not wait here as a consequent CMD_READY request
* will be handled correctly even if idle was not completed.
*
- * The function does nothing for devices with ACPI-start method.
+ * The function does nothing for devices with ACPI-start method
+ * or SMC-start method.
*
* Return: 0 always
*/
static int __maybe_unused crb_go_idle(struct device *dev, struct crb_priv *priv)
{
- if ((priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START) ||
- (priv->flags & CRB_FL_CRB_SMC_START))
+ if ((priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_START_METHOD) ||
+ (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_START_METHOD) ||
+ (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC))
return 0;
iowrite32(CRB_CTRL_REQ_GO_IDLE, &priv->regs_t->ctrl_req);
@@ -174,14 +171,16 @@ static bool crb_wait_for_reg_32(u32 __iomem *reg, u32 mask, u32 value,
* The device should respond within TIMEOUT_C.
*
* The function does nothing for devices with ACPI-start method
+ * or SMC-start method.
*
* Return: 0 on success -ETIME on timeout;
*/
static int __maybe_unused crb_cmd_ready(struct device *dev,
struct crb_priv *priv)
{
- if ((priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START) ||
- (priv->flags & CRB_FL_CRB_SMC_START))
+ if ((priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_START_METHOD) ||
+ (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_START_METHOD) ||
+ (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC))
return 0;
iowrite32(CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY, &priv->regs_t->ctrl_req);
@@ -325,13 +324,20 @@ static int crb_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
/* Make sure that cmd is populated before issuing start. */
wmb();
- if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_CRB_START)
+ /* The reason for the extra quirk is that the PTT in 4th Gen Core CPUs
+ * report only ACPI start but in practice seems to require both
+ * CRB start, hence invoking CRB start method if hid == MSFT0101.
+ */
+ if ((priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER) ||
+ (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED) ||
+ (!strcmp(priv->hid, "MSFT0101")))
iowrite32(CRB_START_INVOKE, &priv->regs_t->ctrl_start);
- if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START)
+ if ((priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_START_METHOD) ||
+ (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_START_METHOD))
rc = crb_do_acpi_start(chip);
- if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_CRB_SMC_START) {
+ if (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC) {
iowrite32(CRB_START_INVOKE, &priv->regs_t->ctrl_start);
rc = tpm_crb_smc_start(&chip->dev, priv->smc_func_id);
}
@@ -345,7 +351,9 @@ static void crb_cancel(struct tpm_chip *chip)
iowrite32(CRB_CANCEL_INVOKE, &priv->regs_t->ctrl_cancel);
- if ((priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START) && crb_do_acpi_start(chip))
+ if (((priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_START_METHOD) ||
+ (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_START_METHOD)) &&
+ crb_do_acpi_start(chip))
dev_err(&chip->dev, "ACPI Start failed\n");
}
@@ -458,7 +466,8 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
* the control area, as one nice sane region except for some older
* stuff that puts the control area outside the ACPI IO region.
*/
- if (!(priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START)) {
+ if ((priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER) ||
+ (priv->sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED)) {
if (buf->control_address == io_res.start +
sizeof(*priv->regs_h))
priv->regs_h = priv->iobase;
@@ -552,18 +561,6 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
- /* The reason for the extra quirk is that the PTT in 4th Gen Core CPUs
- * report only ACPI start but in practice seems to require both
- * ACPI start and CRB start.
- */
- if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER || sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED ||
- !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(device), "MSFT0101"))
- priv->flags |= CRB_FL_CRB_START;
-
- if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_START_METHOD ||
- sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_START_METHOD)
- priv->flags |= CRB_FL_ACPI_START;
-
if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC) {
if (buf->header.length < (sizeof(*buf) + sizeof(*crb_smc))) {
dev_err(dev,
@@ -574,9 +571,11 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
}
crb_smc = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct tpm2_crb_smc, buf, sizeof(*buf));
priv->smc_func_id = crb_smc->smc_func_id;
- priv->flags |= CRB_FL_CRB_SMC_START;
}
+ priv->sm = sm;
+ priv->hid = acpi_device_hid(device);
+
rc = crb_map_io(device, priv, buf);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index 7e55aa9ce680..e2d1055fb814 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <linux/of_device.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include "tpm.h"
#include "tpm_tis_core.h"
@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@ static int tpm_tcg_read_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
}
static int tpm_tcg_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
- u8 *value)
+ const u8 *value)
{
struct tpm_tis_tcg_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_tcg_phy(data);
@@ -365,7 +366,7 @@ static struct pnp_driver tis_pnp_driver = {
},
};
-#define TIS_HID_USR_IDX sizeof(tpm_pnp_tbl)/sizeof(struct pnp_device_id) -2
+#define TIS_HID_USR_IDX (ARRAY_SIZE(tpm_pnp_tbl) - 2)
module_param_string(hid, tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id,
sizeof(tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id), 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(hid, "Set additional specific HID for this driver to probe");
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
index 63bc6c3b949e..fdde971bc810 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ out:
* tpm.c can skip polling for the data to be available as the interrupt is
* waited for here
*/
-static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
+static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
int rc, status, burstcnt;
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static void disable_interrupts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
* tpm.c can skip polling for the data to be available as the interrupt is
* waited for here
*/
-static int tpm_tis_send_main(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
+static int tpm_tis_send_main(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
int rc;
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
int rc = 0;
- u8 cmd_getticks[] = {
+ static const u8 cmd_getticks[] = {
0x00, 0xc1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf1
};
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
index e2212f021a02..6bbac319ff3b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct tpm_tis_phy_ops {
int (*read_bytes)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
u8 *result);
int (*write_bytes)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
- u8 *value);
+ const u8 *value);
int (*read16)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 *result);
int (*read32)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 *result);
int (*write32)(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 src);
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static inline int tpm_tis_read32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
}
static inline int tpm_tis_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
- u16 len, u8 *value)
+ u16 len, const u8 *value)
{
return data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, len, value);
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.c
index 88fe72ae967f..424ff2fde1f2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.c
@@ -46,9 +46,7 @@
struct tpm_tis_spi_phy {
struct tpm_tis_data priv;
struct spi_device *spi_device;
-
- u8 tx_buf[4];
- u8 rx_buf[4];
+ u8 *iobuf;
};
static inline struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *to_tpm_tis_spi_phy(struct tpm_tis_data *data)
@@ -57,7 +55,7 @@ static inline struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *to_tpm_tis_spi_phy(struct tpm_tis_data *da
}
static int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
- u8 *buffer, u8 direction)
+ u8 *in, const u8 *out)
{
struct tpm_tis_spi_phy *phy = to_tpm_tis_spi_phy(data);
int ret = 0;
@@ -71,14 +69,14 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
while (len) {
transfer_len = min_t(u16, len, MAX_SPI_FRAMESIZE);
- phy->tx_buf[0] = direction | (transfer_len - 1);
- phy->tx_buf[1] = 0xd4;
- phy->tx_buf[2] = addr >> 8;
- phy->tx_buf[3] = addr;
+ phy->iobuf[0] = (in ? 0x80 : 0) | (transfer_len - 1);
+ phy->iobuf[1] = 0xd4;
+ phy->iobuf[2] = addr >> 8;
+ phy->iobuf[3] = addr;
memset(&spi_xfer, 0, sizeof(spi_xfer));
- spi_xfer.tx_buf = phy->tx_buf;
- spi_xfer.rx_buf = phy->rx_buf;
+ spi_xfer.tx_buf = phy->iobuf;
+ spi_xfer.rx_buf = phy->iobuf;
spi_xfer.len = 4;
spi_xfer.cs_change = 1;
@@ -88,9 +86,9 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
if (ret < 0)
goto exit;
- if ((phy->rx_buf[3] & 0x01) == 0) {
+ if ((phy->iobuf[3] & 0x01) == 0) {
// handle SPI wait states
- phy->tx_buf[0] = 0;
+ phy->iobuf[0] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < TPM_RETRY; i++) {
spi_xfer.len = 1;
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
ret = spi_sync_locked(phy->spi_device, &m);
if (ret < 0)
goto exit;
- if (phy->rx_buf[0] & 0x01)
+ if (phy->iobuf[0] & 0x01)
break;
}
@@ -113,12 +111,12 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
spi_xfer.len = transfer_len;
spi_xfer.delay_usecs = 5;
- if (direction) {
+ if (in) {
spi_xfer.tx_buf = NULL;
- spi_xfer.rx_buf = buffer;
- } else {
- spi_xfer.tx_buf = buffer;
+ } else if (out) {
spi_xfer.rx_buf = NULL;
+ memcpy(phy->iobuf, out, transfer_len);
+ out += transfer_len;
}
spi_message_init(&m);
@@ -127,8 +125,12 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_transfer(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 len,
if (ret < 0)
goto exit;
+ if (in) {
+ memcpy(in, phy->iobuf, transfer_len);
+ in += transfer_len;
+ }
+
len -= transfer_len;
- buffer += transfer_len;
}
exit:
@@ -139,40 +141,51 @@ exit:
static int tpm_tis_spi_read_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
u16 len, u8 *result)
{
- return tpm_tis_spi_transfer(data, addr, len, result, 0x80);
+ return tpm_tis_spi_transfer(data, addr, len, result, NULL);
}
static int tpm_tis_spi_write_bytes(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr,
- u16 len, u8 *value)
+ u16 len, const u8 *value)
{
- return tpm_tis_spi_transfer(data, addr, len, value, 0);
+ return tpm_tis_spi_transfer(data, addr, len, NULL, value);
}
static int tpm_tis_spi_read16(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u16 *result)
{
+ __le16 result_le;
int rc;
- rc = data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u16), (u8 *)result);
+ rc = data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u16),
+ (u8 *)&result_le);
if (!rc)
- *result = le16_to_cpu(*result);
+ *result = le16_to_cpu(result_le);
+
return rc;
}
static int tpm_tis_spi_read32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 *result)
{
+ __le32 result_le;
int rc;
- rc = data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u32), (u8 *)result);
+ rc = data->phy_ops->read_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u32),
+ (u8 *)&result_le);
if (!rc)
- *result = le32_to_cpu(*result);
+ *result = le32_to_cpu(result_le);
+
return rc;
}
static int tpm_tis_spi_write32(struct tpm_tis_data *data, u32 addr, u32 value)
{
- value = cpu_to_le32(value);
- return data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u32),
- (u8 *)&value);
+ __le32 value_le;
+ int rc;
+
+ value_le = cpu_to_le32(value);
+ rc = data->phy_ops->write_bytes(data, addr, sizeof(u32),
+ (u8 *)&value_le);
+
+ return rc;
}
static const struct tpm_tis_phy_ops tpm_spi_phy_ops = {
@@ -194,6 +207,10 @@ static int tpm_tis_spi_probe(struct spi_device *dev)
phy->spi_device = dev;
+ phy->iobuf = devm_kmalloc(&dev->dev, MAX_SPI_FRAMESIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!phy->iobuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
return tpm_tis_core_init(&dev->dev, &phy->priv, -1, &tpm_spi_phy_ops,
NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index fc46f5b85251..4f8e09340956 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
bool *effective,
- bool *has_cap)
+ bool *has_fcap)
{
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
unsigned i;
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
*effective = true;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
- *has_cap = true;
+ *has_fcap = true;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
goto out;
}
- rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
+ rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -696,6 +696,115 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
+
+static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
+{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); }
+
+/*
+ * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root
+ * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
+ * @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set?
+ * @effective: Do we have effective root privilege?
+ * @root_uid: This namespace' root UID WRT initial USER namespace
+ *
+ * Handle the case where root is privileged and hasn't been neutered by
+ * SECURE_NOROOT. If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with
+ * set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is
+ * updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
+ */
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
+ bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
+{
+ const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+ struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+
+ if (!root_privileged())
+ return;
+ /*
+ * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+ * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
+ * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+ */
+ if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {
+ warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
+ * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
+ * capability sets for the file.
+ */
+ if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {
+ /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
+ new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
+ old->cap_inheritable);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
+ */
+ if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))
+ *effective = true;
+}
+
+#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \
+ !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
+#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
+ !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
+#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
+ cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
+
+static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); }
+
+static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
+
+/*
+ * 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
+ *
+ * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
+ * 1) cap_effective has all caps
+ * 2) we became root *OR* are were already root
+ * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
+ * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
+ *
+ * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
+ * that is interesting information to audit.
+ *
+ * A number of other conditions require logging:
+ * 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps
+ * 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps
+ * 4) non-setuid root gets ambient
+ */
+static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ kuid_t root, bool has_fcap)
+{
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&
+ !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&
+ (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&
+ root_privileged())) ||
+ (root_privileged() &&
+ __is_suid(root, new) &&
+ !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||
+ (!__is_setuid(new, old) &&
+ ((has_fcap &&
+ __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||
+ __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))
+
+ ret = true;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -708,61 +817,33 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+ bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- effective = false;
- ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
+ ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- /*
- * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
- * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
- * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
- */
- if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
- warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
- goto skip;
- }
- /*
- * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
- * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
- * capability sets for the file.
- *
- * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
- */
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
- /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
- new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
- old->cap_inheritable);
- }
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
- effective = true;
- }
-skip:
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
*
* In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
*/
- is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid);
+ is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old);
- if ((is_setid ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
+ if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
!ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -779,7 +860,7 @@ skip:
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
- if (has_cap || is_setid)
+ if (has_fcap || is_setid)
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
/*
@@ -800,26 +881,10 @@ skip:
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
- *
- * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
- * 1) cap_effective has all caps
- * 2) we are root
- * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
- * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
- *
- * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
- * that is interesting information to audit.
- */
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
- if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
- !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
- issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- }
+ if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {
+ ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
@@ -829,13 +894,11 @@ skip:
/* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */
bprm->cap_elevated = 0;
- if (is_setid) {
+ if (is_setid ||
+ (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&
+ (effective ||
+ __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
- } else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
- if (effective ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient))
- bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
- }
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 286171a16ed2..14cc7940b36d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4600,6 +4600,82 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
return 0;
}
+static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
+{
+
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+ if (new_creds == NULL) {
+ new_creds = prepare_creds();
+ if (new_creds == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tsp = new_creds->security;
+
+ /*
+ * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
+ */
+ isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+ skp = isp->smk_inode;
+ tsp->smk_task = skp;
+ *new = new_creds;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+ /*
+ * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ struct cred *new)
+{
+ struct task_smack *otsp = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *ntsp = new->security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ int may;
+
+ /*
+ * Use the process credential unless all of
+ * the transmuting criteria are met
+ */
+ ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
+
+ /*
+ * the attribute of the containing directory
+ */
+ isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known,
+ isp->smk_inode->smk_known,
+ &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /*
+ * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
+ * providing access is transmuting use the containing
+ * directory label instead of the process label.
+ */
+ if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE))
+ ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4735,6 +4811,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
index d330b060dcff..0f73fe30e37a 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
if (!buffer)
return NULL;
- tomoyo_convert_time(get_seconds(), &stamp);
+ tomoyo_convert_time(ktime_get_real_seconds(), &stamp);
pos = snprintf(buffer, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1,
"#%04u/%02u/%02u %02u:%02u:%02u# profile=%u mode=%s "
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 21691b99e61f..25eed4b0b0e8 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ static const char * const tomoyo_memory_headers[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT] = {
/* Timestamp counter for last updated. */
static unsigned int tomoyo_stat_updated[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT];
/* Counter for number of updates. */
-static unsigned int tomoyo_stat_modified[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT];
+static time64_t tomoyo_stat_modified[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT];
/**
* tomoyo_update_stat - Update statistic counters.
@@ -2272,7 +2272,7 @@ void tomoyo_update_stat(const u8 index)
* I don't use atomic operations because race condition is not fatal.
*/
tomoyo_stat_updated[index]++;
- tomoyo_stat_modified[index] = get_seconds();
+ tomoyo_stat_modified[index] = ktime_get_real_seconds();
}
/**
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index e4097d7994b1..7adccdd8e36d 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ void tomoyo_check_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
bool (*check_entry) (struct tomoyo_request_info *,
const struct tomoyo_acl_info *));
void tomoyo_check_profile(void);
-void tomoyo_convert_time(time_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp);
+void tomoyo_convert_time(time64_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp);
void tomoyo_del_condition(struct list_head *element);
void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr);
void tomoyo_get_attributes(struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c
index 580b318910f1..d3d9d9f1edb0 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/util.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c
@@ -87,38 +87,17 @@ const u8 tomoyo_index2category[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX] = {
* @stamp: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_time".
*
* Returns nothing.
- *
- * This function does not handle Y2038 problem.
*/
-void tomoyo_convert_time(time_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp)
+void tomoyo_convert_time(time64_t time64, struct tomoyo_time *stamp)
{
- static const u16 tomoyo_eom[2][12] = {
- { 31, 59, 90, 120, 151, 181, 212, 243, 273, 304, 334, 365 },
- { 31, 60, 91, 121, 152, 182, 213, 244, 274, 305, 335, 366 }
- };
- u16 y;
- u8 m;
- bool r;
- stamp->sec = time % 60;
- time /= 60;
- stamp->min = time % 60;
- time /= 60;
- stamp->hour = time % 24;
- time /= 24;
- for (y = 1970; ; y++) {
- const unsigned short days = (y & 3) ? 365 : 366;
- if (time < days)
- break;
- time -= days;
- }
- r = (y & 3) == 0;
- for (m = 0; m < 11 && time >= tomoyo_eom[r][m]; m++)
- ;
- if (m)
- time -= tomoyo_eom[r][m - 1];
- stamp->year = y;
- stamp->month = ++m;
- stamp->day = ++time;
+ struct tm tm;
+ time64_to_tm(time64, 0, &tm);
+ stamp->sec = tm.tm_sec;
+ stamp->min = tm.tm_min;
+ stamp->hour = tm.tm_hour;
+ stamp->day = tm.tm_mday;
+ stamp->month = tm.tm_mon + 1;
+ stamp->year = tm.tm_year + 1900;
}
/**
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-15 16:41:45 +0000