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Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().
The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.
The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.
LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation
notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it:
The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at
runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If
disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until
the system is rebooted.
The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0"
boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to
make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not
allow for easy modification of the kernel command line.
Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes
it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the
"__ro_after_init" feature.
It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening,
which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the
diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all
the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level.
From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you
continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear
that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state.
If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux
come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot.
It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is
always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing
to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an
error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written.
Finally, in the several years where we have been working on
deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of
someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular
case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround
documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel
command line) resolved the issue without problem.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Let's follow a consistent and documented coding style. Everything may
not be to our liking but it is better than tacit knowledge. Moreover,
this will help maintain style consistency between different developers.
This contains only whitespace changes.
Automatically formatted with:
clang-format-14 -i security/landlock/*.[ch] include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-3-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of
the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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