From 83d2c9a9c17b1e9f23a3a0c24c03cd18e4b02520 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Ebenfeld Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2016 18:51:34 +0100 Subject: crypto: caam - do not register AES-XTS mode on LP units When using AES-XTS on a Wandboard, we receive a Mode error: caam_jr 2102000.jr1: 20001311: CCB: desc idx 19: AES: Mode error. According to the Security Reference Manual, the Low Power AES units of the i.MX6 do not support the XTS mode. Therefore we must not register XTS implementations in the Crypto API. Signed-off-by: Sven Ebenfeld Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă Cc: # 4.4+ Fixes: c6415a6016bf "crypto: caam - add support for acipher xts(aes)" Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c index 156aad167cd6..f5a63ba97023 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c @@ -4583,6 +4583,15 @@ static int __init caam_algapi_init(void) if (!aes_inst && (alg_sel == OP_ALG_ALGSEL_AES)) continue; + /* + * Check support for AES modes not available + * on LP devices. + */ + if ((cha_vid & CHA_ID_LS_AES_MASK) == CHA_ID_LS_AES_LP) + if ((alg->class1_alg_type & OP_ALG_AAI_MASK) == + OP_ALG_AAI_XTS) + continue; + t_alg = caam_alg_alloc(alg); if (IS_ERR(t_alg)) { err = PTR_ERR(t_alg); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a5a40d4624cd2328c69768f6eb41716fc249d7be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2016 23:29:10 +0200 Subject: crypto: caam - fix type mismatch warning Building the caam driver on arm64 produces a harmless warning: drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c:140:139: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast We can use min_t to tell the compiler which type we want it to use here. Fixes: 5ecf8ef9103c ("crypto: caam - fix sg dump") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c index f5a63ba97023..954a64c7757b 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void dbg_dump_sg(const char *level, const char *prefix_str, } buf = it_page + it->offset; - len = min(tlen, it->length); + len = min_t(size_t, tlen, it->length); print_hex_dump(level, prefix_str, prefix_type, rowsize, groupsize, buf, len, ascii); tlen -= len; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a8348bca2944d397a528772f5c0ccb47a8b58af4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2016 22:07:58 +0800 Subject: crypto: algif_hash - Fix NULL hash crash with shash Recently algif_hash has been changed to allow null hashes. This triggers a bug when used with an shash algorithm whereby it will cause a crash during the digest operation. This patch fixes it by avoiding the digest operation and instead doing an init followed by a final which avoids the buggy code in shash. This patch also ensures that the result buffer is freed after an error so that it is not returned as a genuine hash result on the next recv call. The shash/ahash wrapper code will be fixed later to handle this case correctly. Fixes: 493b2ed3f760 ("crypto: algif_hash - Handle NULL hashes correctly") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Tested-by: Laura Abbott --- crypto/algif_hash.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c index 2d8466f9e49b..05e21b464433 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_hash.c +++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c @@ -214,23 +214,26 @@ static int hash_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL, ctx->result, 0); - if (ctx->more) { + if (!result) { + err = af_alg_wait_for_completion( + crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req), + &ctx->completion); + if (err) + goto unlock; + } + + if (!result || ctx->more) { ctx->more = 0; err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req), &ctx->completion); if (err) goto unlock; - } else if (!result) { - err = af_alg_wait_for_completion( - crypto_ahash_digest(&ctx->req), - &ctx->completion); } err = memcpy_to_msg(msg, ctx->result, len); - hash_free_result(sk, ctx); - unlock: + hash_free_result(sk, ctx); release_sock(sk); return err ?: len; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8acf7a106326eb94e143552de81f34308149121c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 15:34:00 +0800 Subject: crypto: algif_hash - Fix result clobbering in recvmsg Recently an init call was added to hash_recvmsg so as to reset the hash state in case a sendmsg call was never made. Unfortunately this ended up clobbering the result if the previous sendmsg was done with a MSG_MORE flag. This patch fixes it by excluding that case when we make the init call. Fixes: a8348bca2944 ("algif_hash - Fix NULL hash crash with shash") Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- crypto/algif_hash.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c index 05e21b464433..d19b09cdf284 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_hash.c +++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int hash_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL, ctx->result, 0); - if (!result) { + if (!result && !ctx->more) { err = af_alg_wait_for_completion( crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req), &ctx->completion); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c8467f7a3620698bf3c22f0e199b550fb611a8ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 16:26:19 +0800 Subject: crypto: scatterwalk - Remove unnecessary aliasing check in map_and_copy The aliasing check in map_and_copy is no longer necessary because the IPsec ESP code no longer provides an IV that points into the actual request data. As this check is now triggering BUG checks due to the vmalloced stack code, I'm removing it. Reported-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- crypto/scatterwalk.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/scatterwalk.c b/crypto/scatterwalk.c index 52ce17a3dd63..c16c94f88733 100644 --- a/crypto/scatterwalk.c +++ b/crypto/scatterwalk.c @@ -68,10 +68,6 @@ void scatterwalk_map_and_copy(void *buf, struct scatterlist *sg, sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(tmp, sg, start); - if (sg_page(sg) == virt_to_page(buf) && - sg->offset == offset_in_page(buf)) - return; - scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg); scatterwalk_copychunks(buf, &walk, nbytes, out); scatterwalk_done(&walk, out, 0); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5102981212454998d549273ff9847f19e97a1794 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Mueller Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 09:45:04 +0100 Subject: crypto: drbg - prevent invalid SG mappings When using SGs, only heap memory (memory that is valid as per virt_addr_valid) is allowed to be referenced. The CTR DRBG used to reference the caller-provided memory directly in an SG. In case the caller provided stack memory pointers, the SG mapping is not considered to be valid. In some cases, this would even cause a paging fault. The change adds a new scratch buffer that is used unconditionally to catch the cases where the caller-provided buffer is not suitable for use in an SG. The crypto operation of the CTR DRBG produces its output with that scratch buffer and finally copies the content of the scratch buffer to the caller's buffer. The scratch buffer is allocated during allocation time of the CTR DRBG as its access is protected with the DRBG mutex. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- crypto/drbg.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/crypto/drbg.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index fb33f7d3b052..053035b5c8f8 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ static int drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(struct drbg_state *drbg, u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen, u8 *outbuf, u32 outlen); #define DRBG_CTR_NULL_LEN 128 +#define DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN DRBG_CTR_NULL_LEN /* BCC function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.3 */ static int drbg_ctr_bcc(struct drbg_state *drbg, @@ -1644,6 +1645,9 @@ static int drbg_fini_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg) kfree(drbg->ctr_null_value_buf); drbg->ctr_null_value = NULL; + kfree(drbg->outscratchpadbuf); + drbg->outscratchpadbuf = NULL; + return 0; } @@ -1708,6 +1712,15 @@ static int drbg_init_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg) drbg->ctr_null_value = (u8 *)PTR_ALIGN(drbg->ctr_null_value_buf, alignmask + 1); + drbg->outscratchpadbuf = kmalloc(DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN + alignmask, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!drbg->outscratchpadbuf) { + drbg_fini_sym_kernel(drbg); + return -ENOMEM; + } + drbg->outscratchpad = (u8 *)PTR_ALIGN(drbg->outscratchpadbuf, + alignmask + 1); + return alignmask; } @@ -1737,15 +1750,16 @@ static int drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(struct drbg_state *drbg, u8 *outbuf, u32 outlen) { struct scatterlist sg_in; + int ret; sg_init_one(&sg_in, inbuf, inlen); while (outlen) { - u32 cryptlen = min_t(u32, inlen, outlen); + u32 cryptlen = min3(inlen, outlen, (u32)DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN); struct scatterlist sg_out; - int ret; - sg_init_one(&sg_out, outbuf, cryptlen); + /* Output buffer may not be valid for SGL, use scratchpad */ + sg_init_one(&sg_out, drbg->outscratchpad, cryptlen); skcipher_request_set_crypt(drbg->ctr_req, &sg_in, &sg_out, cryptlen, drbg->V); ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(drbg->ctr_req); @@ -1761,14 +1775,19 @@ static int drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(struct drbg_state *drbg, break; } default: - return ret; + goto out; } init_completion(&drbg->ctr_completion); + memcpy(outbuf, drbg->outscratchpad, cryptlen); + outlen -= cryptlen; } + ret = 0; - return 0; +out: + memzero_explicit(drbg->outscratchpad, DRBG_OUTSCRATCHLEN); + return ret; } #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */ diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h index 61580b19f9f6..22f884c97387 100644 --- a/include/crypto/drbg.h +++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h @@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ struct drbg_state { struct skcipher_request *ctr_req; /* CTR mode request handle */ __u8 *ctr_null_value_buf; /* CTR mode unaligned buffer */ __u8 *ctr_null_value; /* CTR mode aligned zero buf */ + __u8 *outscratchpadbuf; /* CTR mode output scratchpad */ + __u8 *outscratchpad; /* CTR mode aligned outbuf */ struct completion ctr_completion; /* CTR mode async handler */ int ctr_async_err; /* CTR mode async error */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 66bf093772040ae8b864d2cf953f2c73005f7815 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Harsh Jain Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 19:00:34 +0530 Subject: crypto: chcr - Fix memory corruption Fix memory corruption done by *((u32 *)dec_key + k) operation. Signed-off-by: Jitendra Lulla Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.h b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.h index ec64fbcdeb49..199b0bb69b89 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.h @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static inline void get_aes_decrypt_key(unsigned char *dec_key, { u32 temp; u32 w_ring[MAX_NK]; - int i, j, k = 0; + int i, j, k; u8 nr, nk; switch (keylength) { @@ -460,6 +460,7 @@ static inline void get_aes_decrypt_key(unsigned char *dec_key, temp = w_ring[i % nk]; i++; } + i--; for (k = 0, j = i % nk; k < nk; k++) { *((u32 *)dec_key + k) = htonl(w_ring[j]); j--; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 57891633eeef60e732e045731cf20e50ee80acb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Michael Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 11:15:12 -0800 Subject: crypto: rsa - Add Makefile dependencies to fix parallel builds Both asn1 headers are included by rsa_helper.c, so rsa_helper.o should explicitly depend on them. Signed-off-by: David Michael Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- crypto/Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile index 99cc64ac70ef..bd6a029094e6 100644 --- a/crypto/Makefile +++ b/crypto/Makefile @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDH) += ecdh_generic.o $(obj)/rsapubkey-asn1.o: $(obj)/rsapubkey-asn1.c $(obj)/rsapubkey-asn1.h $(obj)/rsaprivkey-asn1.o: $(obj)/rsaprivkey-asn1.c $(obj)/rsaprivkey-asn1.h +$(obj)/rsa_helper.o: $(obj)/rsapubkey-asn1.h $(obj)/rsaprivkey-asn1.h clean-files += rsapubkey-asn1.c rsapubkey-asn1.h clean-files += rsaprivkey-asn1.c rsaprivkey-asn1.h -- cgit v1.2.3