From 8d58f222e85f01da0c0e1fc1e77986c86de889e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 18:36:23 -0700 Subject: ubsan: disable UBSAN_ALIGNMENT under COMPILE_TEST The documentation for UBSAN_ALIGNMENT already mentions that it should not be used on all*config builds (and for efficient-unaligned-access architectures), so just refactor the Kconfig to correctly implement this so randconfigs will stop creating insane images that freak out objtool under CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP (due to the false positives producing functions that never return, etc). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/202005011433.C42EA3E2D@keescook Fixes: 0887a7ebc977 ("ubsan: add trap instrumentation option") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reported-by: Randy Dunlap Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/202004231224.D6B3B650@keescook/ Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Stephen Rothwell Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- lib/Kconfig.ubsan | 15 ++++++--------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan index 48469c95d78e..929211039bac 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan +++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan @@ -60,18 +60,15 @@ config UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL Enabling this option will get kernel image size increased significantly. -config UBSAN_NO_ALIGNMENT - bool "Disable checking of pointers alignment" - default y if HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS +config UBSAN_ALIGNMENT + bool "Enable checks for pointers alignment" + default !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS + depends on !X86 || !COMPILE_TEST help - This option disables the check of unaligned memory accesses. - This option should be used when building allmodconfig. - Disabling this option on architectures that support unaligned + This option enables the check of unaligned memory accesses. + Enabling this option on architectures that support unaligned accesses may produce a lot of false positives. -config UBSAN_ALIGNMENT - def_bool !UBSAN_NO_ALIGNMENT - config TEST_UBSAN tristate "Module for testing for undefined behavior detection" depends on m -- cgit v1.2.3 From b2a5212fb634561bb734c6356904e37f6665b955 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 12:11:18 +0200 Subject: bpf: Restrict bpf_trace_printk()'s %s usage and add %pks, %pus specifier Usage of plain %s conversion specifier in bpf_trace_printk() suffers from the very same issue as bpf_probe_read{,str}() helpers, that is, it is broken on archs with overlapping address ranges. While the helpers have been addressed through work in 6ae08ae3dea2 ("bpf: Add probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers"), we need an option for bpf_trace_printk() as well to fix it. Similarly as with the helpers, force users to make an explicit choice by adding %pks and %pus specifier to bpf_trace_printk() which will then pick the corresponding strncpy_from_unsafe*() variant to perform the access under KERNEL_DS or USER_DS. The %pk* (kernel specifier) and %pu* (user specifier) can later also be extended for other objects aside strings that are probed and printed under tracing, and reused out of other facilities like bpf_seq_printf() or BTF based type printing. Existing behavior of %s for current users is still kept working for archs where it is not broken and therefore gated through CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE. For archs not having this property we fall-back to pick probing under KERNEL_DS as a sensible default. Fixes: 8d3b7dce8622 ("bpf: add support for %s specifier to bpf_trace_printk()") Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Brendan Gregg Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200515101118.6508-4-daniel@iogearbox.net --- Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst | 14 +++++ kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++----------- lib/vsprintf.c | 12 ++++ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst b/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst index 8ebe46b1af39..5dfcc4592b23 100644 --- a/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst +++ b/Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst @@ -112,6 +112,20 @@ used when printing stack backtraces. The specifier takes into consideration the effect of compiler optimisations which may occur when tail-calls are used and marked with the noreturn GCC attribute. +Probed Pointers from BPF / tracing +---------------------------------- + +:: + + %pks kernel string + %pus user string + +The ``k`` and ``u`` specifiers are used for printing prior probed memory from +either kernel memory (k) or user memory (u). The subsequent ``s`` specifier +results in printing a string. For direct use in regular vsnprintf() the (k) +and (u) annotation is ignored, however, when used out of BPF's bpf_trace_printk(), +for example, it reads the memory it is pointing to without faulting. + Kernel Pointers --------------- diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index b83bdaa31c7b..a010edc37ee0 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -323,17 +323,15 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_probe_write_proto(void) /* * Only limited trace_printk() conversion specifiers allowed: - * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %s + * %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %pks %pus %s */ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1, u64, arg2, u64, arg3) { + int i, mod[3] = {}, fmt_cnt = 0; + char buf[64], fmt_ptype; + void *unsafe_ptr = NULL; bool str_seen = false; - int mod[3] = {}; - int fmt_cnt = 0; - u64 unsafe_addr; - char buf[64]; - int i; /* * bpf_check()->check_func_arg()->check_stack_boundary() @@ -359,40 +357,71 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1, if (fmt[i] == 'l') { mod[fmt_cnt]++; i++; - } else if (fmt[i] == 'p' || fmt[i] == 's') { + } else if (fmt[i] == 'p') { mod[fmt_cnt]++; + if ((fmt[i + 1] == 'k' || + fmt[i + 1] == 'u') && + fmt[i + 2] == 's') { + fmt_ptype = fmt[i + 1]; + i += 2; + goto fmt_str; + } + /* disallow any further format extensions */ if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 && !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) && !ispunct(fmt[i + 1])) return -EINVAL; - fmt_cnt++; - if (fmt[i] == 's') { - if (str_seen) - /* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */ - return -EINVAL; - str_seen = true; - - switch (fmt_cnt) { - case 1: - unsafe_addr = arg1; - arg1 = (long) buf; - break; - case 2: - unsafe_addr = arg2; - arg2 = (long) buf; - break; - case 3: - unsafe_addr = arg3; - arg3 = (long) buf; - break; - } - buf[0] = 0; - strncpy_from_unsafe(buf, - (void *) (long) unsafe_addr, + + goto fmt_next; + } else if (fmt[i] == 's') { + mod[fmt_cnt]++; + fmt_ptype = fmt[i]; +fmt_str: + if (str_seen) + /* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */ + return -EINVAL; + str_seen = true; + + if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 && + !isspace(fmt[i + 1]) && + !ispunct(fmt[i + 1])) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (fmt_cnt) { + case 0: + unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg1; + arg1 = (long)buf; + break; + case 1: + unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg2; + arg2 = (long)buf; + break; + case 2: + unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg3; + arg3 = (long)buf; + break; + } + + buf[0] = 0; + switch (fmt_ptype) { + case 's': +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE + strncpy_from_unsafe(buf, unsafe_ptr, sizeof(buf)); + break; +#endif + case 'k': + strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(buf, unsafe_ptr, + sizeof(buf)); + break; + case 'u': + strncpy_from_unsafe_user(buf, + (__force void __user *)unsafe_ptr, + sizeof(buf)); + break; } - continue; + goto fmt_next; } if (fmt[i] == 'l') { @@ -403,6 +432,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1, if (fmt[i] != 'i' && fmt[i] != 'd' && fmt[i] != 'u' && fmt[i] != 'x') return -EINVAL; +fmt_next: fmt_cnt++; } diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index 7c488a1ce318..532b6606a18a 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -2168,6 +2168,10 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, * f full name * P node name, including a possible unit address * - 'x' For printing the address. Equivalent to "%lx". + * - '[ku]s' For a BPF/tracing related format specifier, e.g. used out of + * bpf_trace_printk() where [ku] prefix specifies either kernel (k) + * or user (u) memory to probe, and: + * s a string, equivalent to "%s" on direct vsnprintf() use * * ** When making changes please also update: * Documentation/core-api/printk-formats.rst @@ -2251,6 +2255,14 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, if (!IS_ERR(ptr)) break; return err_ptr(buf, end, ptr, spec); + case 'u': + case 'k': + switch (fmt[1]) { + case 's': + return string(buf, end, ptr, spec); + default: + return error_string(buf, end, "(einval)", spec); + } } /* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */ -- cgit v1.2.3