diff options
| author | Andrea zi0Black Cappa | 2022-05-18 16:30:08 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tom Rini | 2022-05-26 10:32:06 -0400 |
| commit | bdbf7a05e26f3c5fd437c99e2755ffde186ddc80 (patch) | |
| tree | ed0772cd40b66157b9c6a007d995b707f3941ef1 /net/nfs.c | |
| parent | 9e892ac27670e094ce4bade5a13b4d0e3a7c4da3 (diff) | |
net: nfs: Fix CVE-2022-30767 (old CVE-2019-14196)
This patch mitigates the vulnerability identified via CVE-2019-14196.
The previous patch was bypassed/ineffective, and now the vulnerability
is identified via CVE-2022-30767. The patch removes the sanity check
introduced to mitigate CVE-2019-14196 since it's ineffective.
filefh3_length is changed to unsigned type integer, preventing negative
numbers from being used during comparison with positive values during
size sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Andrea zi0Black Cappa <zi0Black@protonmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/nfs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/nfs.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/nfs.c b/net/nfs.c index 3c01cebd96f..9152ab742ef 100644 --- a/net/nfs.c +++ b/net/nfs.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static const ulong nfs_timeout = CONFIG_NFS_TIMEOUT; static char dirfh[NFS_FHSIZE]; /* NFSv2 / NFSv3 file handle of directory */ static char filefh[NFS3_FHSIZE]; /* NFSv2 / NFSv3 file handle */ -static int filefh3_length; /* (variable) length of filefh when NFSv3 */ +static unsigned int filefh3_length; /* (variable) length of filefh when NFSv3 */ static enum net_loop_state nfs_download_state; static struct in_addr nfs_server_ip; @@ -573,8 +573,6 @@ static int nfs_lookup_reply(uchar *pkt, unsigned len) filefh3_length = ntohl(rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[1]); if (filefh3_length > NFS3_FHSIZE) filefh3_length = NFS3_FHSIZE; - if (((uchar *)&(rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[0]) - (uchar *)(&rpc_pkt) + filefh3_length) > len) - return -NFS_RPC_DROP; memcpy(filefh, rpc_pkt.u.reply.data + 2, filefh3_length); } |