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Drop all duplicate newlines. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut+renesas@mailbox.org>
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As part of bringing the master branch back in to next, we need to allow
for all of these changes to exist here.
Reported-by: Jonas Karlman <jonas@kwiboo.se>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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When bringing in the series 'arm: dts: am62-beagleplay: Fix Beagleplay
Ethernet"' I failed to notice that b4 noticed it was based on next and
so took that as the base commit and merged that part of next to master.
This reverts commit c8ffd1356d42223cbb8c86280a083cc3c93e6426, reversing
changes made to 2ee6f3a5f7550de3599faef9704e166e5dcace35.
Reported-by: Jonas Karlman <jonas@kwiboo.se>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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Remove <common.h> from all "net/" files and when needed add
missing include files directly.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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Add an option to trace all packets send/received. This can be helpful when
debugging protocol issues, as the packets can then be imported into
wireshark [1] and analyzed further.
[1] https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChIOImportSection.html
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <seanga2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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When fastboot is enabled in U-Boot proper and SPL_NET is enabled, we will
try to (unsuccessfully) reference it in SPL. Fix these linker errors by
conditioning on SPL_UDP/TCP_FUNCTION_FASTBOOT.
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <seanga2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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In the case of NETLOOP_SUCCESS, the decimal value of the u32 variable
"net_boot_file_size" is printed using "%d", resulting in negative values
being reported for large file sizes. Fix this by using "%u" to print the
decimal value corresponding to the bytes transferred.
Fixes: 1411157d8578 ("net: cosmetic: Fixup var names related to boot file")
Signed-off-by: Siddharth Vadapalli <s-vadapalli@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
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In IPv6, the default gateway and prefix length are determined by receiving
a router advertisement as defined in -
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4861.
Add support for sending router solicitation (RS) and processing router
advertisements (RA).
If the RA has prefix info option and following conditions are met, then
gatewayip6 and net_prefix_length of ip6addr env variables are initialized.
These are later consumed by IPv6 code for non-local destination IP.
- "Router Lifetime" != 0
- Prefix is NOT link-local prefix (0xfe80::/10)
- L flag is 1
- "Valid Lifetime" != 0
Timing Parameters:
- MAX_RTR_SOLICITATION_DELAY (0-1s)
- RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL (4s) (min retransmit delay)
- MAX_RTR_SOLICITATIONS (3 RS transmissions)
The functionality is enabled by CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_DISCOVERY and invoked
automatically from net_init_loop().
Signed-off-by: Ehsan Mohandesi <emohandesi@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>Reviewed-by:
Tested-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Tested-by: Sergei Antonov <saproj@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergei Antonov <saproj@gmail.com>
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Known limitations are
1. fastboot reboot doesn't work (answering OK but not rebooting)
2. flashing isn't supported (TCP transport only limitation)
The command syntax is
fastboot tcp
Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Merkurev <dimorinny@google.com>
Cc: Ying-Chun Liu (PaulLiu) <paul.liu@linaro.org>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Сс: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Сс: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Adds DHCPv6 protocol to u-boot.
Allows for address assignement with DHCPv6 4-message exchange
(SOLICIT->ADVERTISE->REQUEST->REPLY). Includes DHCPv6 options
required by RFC 8415. Also adds DHCPv6 options required
for PXE boot.
Possible enhancements:
- Duplicate address detection on DHCPv6 assigned address
- IPv6 address assignement through SLAAC
- Sending/parsing other DHCPv6 options (NTP, DNS, etc...)
Signed-off-by: Sean Edmond <seanedmond@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
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For bootstd tests it is seldom useful to have ethernet enabled. Add a way
to disable it, so that ethernet operations like tftpboot do nothing.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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IPv6 protocol handler is not terminated with a break statment.
It can lead to running unexpected code.
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Schwierzeck <daniel.schwierzeck@gmail.com>
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Implement ping6 command to ping hosts using IPv6. It works the same way as
an ordinary ping command. There is no ICMP request so it is not possible
to ping our host. This patch adds options in Kconfig and Makefile to
build ping6 command.
Series-changes: 3
- Added structures and functions descriptions
- Added to ping6_receive() return value instead of void
Series-changes: 4
- Fixed structures and functions description style
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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The command tftpboot uses IPv4 by default. Add the possibility to use IPv6
instead. If an address in the command is an IPv6 address it will use IPv6
to boot or if there is a suffix -ipv6 in the end of the command it also
force using IPv6. All other tftpboot features and parameters are left
the same.
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Add net_ip6_handler (an IPv6 packet handler) into net_loop. Add
neighbor discovery mechanism into network init process. That is the
main step to run IPv6 in u-boot. Now u-boot is capable to use NDP and
handle IPv6 packets.
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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This commit adds a simple wget command that can download files
from http server.
The command syntax is
wget ${loadaddr} <path of the file from server>
Signed-off-by: Duncan Hare <DuncanCHare@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Ying-Chun Liu (PaulLiu) <paul.liu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
Cc: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
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Currently file transfers are done using tftp or NFS both
over udp. This requires a request to be sent from client
(u-boot) to the boot server.
The current standard is TCP with selective acknowledgment.
Signed-off-by: Duncan Hare <DH@Synoia.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan Hare <DuncanCHare@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Ying-Chun Liu (PaulLiu) <paul.liu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
Cc: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
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With a suitable sequence of malicious packets, it's currently possible
to get a hole descriptor to contain arbitrary attacker-controlled
contents, and then with one more packet to use that as an arbitrary
write vector.
While one could possibly change the algorithm so we instead loop over
all holes, and in each hole puts as much of the current fragment as
belongs there (taking care to carefully update the hole list as
appropriate), it's not worth the complexity: In real, non-malicious
scenarios, one never gets overlapping fragments, and certainly not
fragments that would be supersets of one another.
So instead opt for this simple protection: Simply don't allow the
eventual memcpy() to write beyond the last_byte of the current hole.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
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For some reason, the ip_len field in a reassembled IP datagram is set
to just the size of the payload, but it should be set to the value it
would have had if the datagram had never been fragmented in the first
place, i.e. size of payload plus size of IP header.
That latter value is currently returned correctly via the "len"
variable. And before entering net_defragment(), len does have the
value ntohs(ip->ip_len), so if we're not dealing with a
fragment (so net_defragment leaves *len alone), that relationship of
course also holds after the net_defragment() call.
The only use I can find of ip->ip_len after the net_defragment call is
the ntohs(ip->udp_len) > ntohs(ip->ip_len) sanity check - none of the
functions that are passed the "ip" pointer themselves inspect ->ip_len
but instead use the passed len.
But that sanity check is a bit odd, since the RHS really should be
"ntohs(ip->ip_len) - 20", i.e. the IP payload size.
Now that we've fixed things so that len == ntohs(ip->ip_len) in all
cases, change that sanity check to use len-20 as the RHS.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
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I hit a strange problem with v2022.10: Sometimes my tftp transfer
would seemingly just hang. It only happened for some files. Moreover,
changing tftpblocksize from 65464 to 65460 or 65000 made it work again
for all the files I tried. So I started suspecting it had something to
do with the file sizes and in particular the way the tftp blocks get
fragmented and reassembled.
v2022.01 showed no problems with any of the files or any value of
tftpblocksize.
Looking at what had changed in net.c or tftp.c since January showed
only one remotely interesting thing, b85d130ea0ca.
So I fired up wireshark on my host to see if somehow one of the
packets would be too small. But no, with both v2022.01 and v2022.10,
the exact same sequence of packets were sent, all but the last of size
1500, and the last being 1280 bytes.
But then it struck me that 1280 is 5*256, so one of the two bytes
on-the-wire is 0 and the other is 5, and when then looking at the code
again the lack of endianness conversion becomes obvious. [ntohs is
both applied to ip->ip_off just above, as well as to ip->ip_len just a
little further down when the "len" is actually computed].
IOWs the current code would falsely reject any packet which happens to
be a multiple of 256 bytes in size, breaking tftp transfers somewhat
randomly, and if it did get one of those "malicious" packets with
ip_len set to, say, 27, it would be seen by this check as being 6912
and hence not rejected.
====
Now, just adding the missing ntohs() would make my initial problem go
away, in that I can now download the file where the last fragment ends
up being 1280 bytes. But there's another bug in the code and/or
analysis: The right-hand side is too strict, in that it is ok for the
last fragment not to have a multiple of 8 bytes as payload - it really
must be ok, because nothing in the IP spec says that IP datagrams must
have a multiple of 8 bytes as payload. And comments in the code also
mention this.
To fix that, replace the comparison with <= IP_HDR_SIZE and add
another check that len is actually a multiple of 8 when the "more
fragments" bit is set - which it necessarily is for the case where
offset8 ends up being 0, since we're only called when
(ip_off & (IP_OFFS | IP_FLAGS_MFRAG)).
====
So, does this fix CVE-2022-30790 for real? It certainly correctly
rejects the POC code which relies on sending a packet of size 27 with
the MFRAG flag set. Can the attack be carried out with a size 27
packet that doesn't set MFRAG (hence must set a non-zero fragment
offset)? I dunno. If we get a packet without MFRAG, we update
h->last_byte in the hole we've found to be start+len, hence we'd enter
one of
if ((h >= thisfrag) && (h->last_byte <= start + len)) {
or
} else if (h->last_byte <= start + len) {
and thus won't reach any of the
/* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
/* fragment sits in the middle: split the hole */
newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
IOW these division are now guaranteed to be exact, and thus I think
the scenario in CVE-2022-30790 cannot happen anymore.
====
However, there's a big elephant in the room, which has always been
spelled out in the comments, and which makes me believe that one can
still cause mayhem even with packets whose payloads are all 8-byte
aligned:
This code doesn't deal with a fragment that overlaps with two
different holes (thus being a superset of a previously-received
fragment).
Suppose each character below represents 8 bytes, with D being already
received data, H being a hole descriptor (struct hole), h being
non-populated chunks, and P representing where the payload of a just
received packet should go:
DDDHhhhhDDDDHhhhDDDD
PPPPPPPPP
I'm pretty sure in this case we'd end up with h being the first hole,
enter the simple
} else if (h->last_byte <= start + len) {
/* overlaps with final part of the hole: shorten this hole */
h->last_byte = start;
case, and thus in the memcpy happily overwrite the second H with our
chosen payload. This is probably worth fixing...
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
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While the code mostly/only handles UDP packets, it's possible for the
last fragment of a fragmented UDP packet to be smaller than 28 bytes;
it can be as small as 21 bytes (an IP header plus one byte of
payload). So until we've performed the defragmentation step and thus
know whether we're now holding a full packet, we should only check for
the existence of the fields in the ip header, i.e. that there are at
least 20 bytes present.
In practice, we always seem to be handed a "len" of minimum 60 from the
device layer, i.e. minimal ethernet frame length minus FCS, so this is
mostly theoretical.
After we've fetched the header's claimed length and used that to
update the len variable, check that the header itself claims to be the
minimal possible length.
This is probably how CVE-2022-30552 should have been dealt with in the
first place, because net_defragment() is not the only place that wants
to know the size of the IP datagram payload: If we receive a
non-fragmented ICMP packet, we pass "len" to receive_icmp() which in
turn may pass it to ping_receive() which does
compute_ip_checksum(icmph, len - IP_HDR_SIZE)
and due to the signature of compute_ip_checksum(), that would then
lead to accessing ~4G of address space, very likely leading to a
crash.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
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There's no reason we should accept an IP packet with a malformed IHL
field. So ensure that it is exactly 5, not just <= 5.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
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Adds an "ncsi" command to manually start NC-SI configuration.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
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Add the handling of NC-SI ethernet frames, and add a check at the start
of net_loop() to configure NC-SI before starting other network commands.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
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Globally replace all occurances of WATCHDOG_RESET() with schedule(),
which handles the HW_WATCHDOG functionality and the cyclic
infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> [am335x_evm, mx6cuboxi, rpi_3,dra7xx_evm, pine64_plus, am65x_evm, j721e_evm]
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Nicolas Bidron and Nicolas Guigo reported the two bugs below:
"
----------BUG 1----------
In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of
`ip->ip_len` (IP packet header's Total Length) higher than `IP_HDR_SIZE`
and strictly lower than `IP_HDR_SIZE+8` will lead to a value for `len`
comprised between `0` and `7`. This will ultimately result in a
truncated division by `8` resulting value of `0` forcing the hole
metadata and fragment to point to the same location. The subsequent
memcopy will overwrite the hole metadata with the fragment data. Through
a second fragment, this can be exploited to write to an arbitrary offset
controlled by that overwritten hole metadata value.
This bug is only exploitable locally as it requires crafting two packets
the first of which would most likely be dropped through routing due to
its unexpectedly low Total Length. However, this bug can potentially be
exploited to root linux based embedded devices locally.
```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
static u16 first_hole, total_len;
struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
/* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
offset8 = (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
thisfrag = payload + offset8;
start = offset8 * 8;
len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```
The last line of the previous excerpt from `u-boot/net/net.c` shows how
the attacker can control the value of `len` to be strictly lower than
`8` by issuing a packet with `ip_len` between `21` and `27`
(`IP_HDR_SIZE` has a value of `20`).
Also note that `offset8` here is `0` which leads to `thisfrag = payload`.
```C
} else if (h >= thisfrag) {
/* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
*newh = *h;
h = newh;
if (h->next_hole)
payload[h->next_hole].prev_hole = (h - payload);
if (h->prev_hole)
payload[h->prev_hole].next_hole = (h - payload);
else
first_hole = (h - payload);
} else {
```
Lower down the same function, execution reaches the above code path.
Here, `len / 8` evaluates to `0` leading to `newh = thisfrag`. Also note
that `first_hole` here is `0` since `h` and `payload` point to the same
location.
```C
/* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```
Finally, in the above excerpt the `memcpy` overwrites the hole metadata
since `thisfrag` and `h` both point to the same location. The hole
metadata is effectively overwritten with arbitrary data from the
fragmented IP packet data. If `len` was crafted to be `6`, `last_byte`,
`next_hole`, and `prev_hole` of the `first_hole` can be controlled by
the attacker.
Finally the arbitrary offset write occurs through a second fragment that
only needs to be crafted to write data in the hole pointed to by the
previously controlled hole metadata (`next_hole`) from the first packet.
### Recommendation
Handle cases where `len` is strictly lower than 8 by preventing the
overwrite of the hole metadata during the memcpy of the fragment. This
could be achieved by either:
* Moving the location where the hole metadata is stored when `len` is
lower than `8`.
* Or outright rejecting fragmented IP datagram with a Total Length
(`ip_len`) lower than 28 bytes which is the minimum valid fragmented IP
datagram size (as defined as the minimum fragment of 8 octets in the IP
Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 25).
----------BUG 2----------
In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of
`ip->ip_len` (IP packet header's Total Length) lower than `IP_HDR_SIZE`
will lead to a negative value for `len` which will ultimately result in
a buffer overflow during the subsequent `memcpy` that uses `len` as it's
`count` parameter.
This bug is only exploitable on local ethernet as it requires crafting
an invalid packet to include an unexpected `ip_len` value in the IP UDP
header that's lower than the minimum accepted Total Length of a packet
(21 as defined in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791)). Such packet
would in all likelihood be dropped while being routed to its final
destination through most routing equipment and as such requires the
attacker to be in a local position in order to be exploited.
```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
static u16 first_hole, total_len;
struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
/* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
offset8 = (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
thisfrag = payload + offset8;
start = offset8 * 8;
len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```
The last line of the previous excerpt from `u-boot/net/net.c` shows
where the underflow to a negative `len` value occurs if `ip_len` is set
to a value strictly lower than 20 (`IP_HDR_SIZE` being 20). Also note
that in the above excerpt the `pkt_buff` buffer has a size of
`CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG` which defaults to 16 KB but can range from 1KB to
64 KB depending on configurations.
```C
/* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```
In the above excerpt the `memcpy` overflows the destination by
attempting to make a copy of nearly 4 gigabytes in a buffer that's
designed to hold `CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG` bytes at most which leads to a DoS.
### Recommendation
Stop processing of the packet if `ip_len` is lower than 21 (as defined
by the minimum length of a data carrying datagram in the IP
Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 34)."
Add a check for ip_len lesser than 28 and stop processing the packet
in this case.
Such a check covers the two reported bugs.
Reported-by: Nicolas Bidron <nicolas.bidron@nccgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
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- U-boot's PXE flow supports prefixing your bootfile name with an
IP address to fetch from a server other than the DHCP server,
e.g. `hostIPaddr:bootfilename`:
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commit/a93907c43f847f076dd0e34ee3b69b5e8e6d0d29
- However, this breaks bootfile paths which contain a colon, e.g.
`f0:ad:4e:10:1b:87/7/pxelinux.cfg/default`
- This patch checks whether the `hostIPaddr` prefix is a valid
IP address before overriding the serverIP otherwise the whole
bootfile path is preserved
Signed-off-by: Lyle Franklin <lylejfranklin@gmail.com>
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Use IS_ENABLED() instead, to reduce the number of build paths.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
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This converts the following to Kconfig:
CONFIG_UDP_CHECKSUM
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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It is a pain to have to specify the value 10 in each call. Add a new
dectoul() function and update the code to use it.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Should not init eth device when doing ping in netconsole.
Signed-off-by: Yang Liu <yliu@cybertec.com.au>
Cc: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
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net_init does not always succeed, and there is no existing mechanism to
discover errors. This patch allows callers of net_init (such as net_init)
to handle errors. The root issue is that eth_get_dev can fail, but
net_init_loop doesn't expose that. The ideal way to fix eth_get_dev would
be to return an error with ERR_PTR, but there are a lot of callers, and all
of them just check if it's NULL. Another approach would be to change the
signature to something like
int eth_get_dev(struct udevice **pdev)
but that would require rewriting all of the many callers.
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <seanga2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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This commits update the support of sntp to use
the framework udp. This change allows to remove
all the reference to sntp in the main network
file net/net.c.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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This commit adds a generic udp protocol framework in the
network loop. So protocol based on udp may be implemented
without modifying the network loop (for example custom
wait magic packet).
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Reset the stored ping IP address before entering a netloop with different
protocol to ensure that it won't be interrupted by the received
correct ICMP_ECHO_REPLY packet.
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
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The random_port() routine is not used anywhere else. Make it local to
dns.c to reduce code clutter, and shrink generated code a little.
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
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If 'CONFIG_CMD_TFTPBOOT' or 'CONFIG_CMD_BOOTP' are disabled, the usage must be disabled, too!
Signed-off-by: Olaf Krebs <olaf.krebs@emh-metering.com>
CC: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
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Move this header out of the common header.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Move this fairly uncommon header out of the common header.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
|
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These three globals relate to image handling. Move them to the image
header file.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
|
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These global variables are quite short and generic. In fact the same name
is more often used locally for struct members and function arguments.
Add a image_ prefix to make them easier to distinguish.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
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sandbox_defconfig does not compile using GCC 9.2.1:
net/net.c: In function ‘net_process_received_packet’:
net/net.c:1288:23: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct
ip_udp_hdr’ may result in an unaligned pointer value
[-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1288 | sumptr = (ushort *)&(ip->udp_src);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Avoid the error by using a u8 pointer instead of an u16 pointer and
in-lining ntohs().
Simplify the checksumming of the last message byte.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Goldschmidt <simon.k.r.goldschmidt@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
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While we have networking use cases within SPL we do not support loading
files via NFS at this point in time. Disable calling nfs_start() so
that the NFS related code can be garbage collected at link time.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
|
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Part of the env cleanup moved this out of the environment code and into
the net code. However, this helper is sometimes needed even when the net
stack isn't included.
Move the helper to lib/net_utils.c like it's similarly-purposed
string_to_ip(). Also rename the moved function to similar naming.
Signed-off-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Reported-by: Ondrej Jirman <megous@megous.com>
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This feature is not enabled by any board. Drop it.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
|
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This patch adds a check to udp_len to fix unbounded memcpy for
CVE-2019-14192, CVE-2019-14193 and CVE-2019-14199.
Signed-off-by: Cheng Liu <liucheng32@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Goldschmidt <simon.k.r.goldschmidt@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Fermín Serna <fermin@semmle.com>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
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Add support for capturing ethernet packets and storing
them in memory in PCAP(2.4) format, later to be analyzed by
any PCAP viewer software (IE. Wireshark)
This feature greatly assist debugging network issues such
as detecting dropped packets, packet corruption etc.
Signed-off-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Marginean <alexm.osslist@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alex Marginean <alexm.osslist@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
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This file contains lots of internal details about the environment. Most
code can include env.h instead, calling the functions there as needed.
Rename this file and add a comment at the top to indicate its internal
nature.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Goldschmidt <simon.k.r.goldschmidt@gmail.com>
[trini: Fixup apalis-tk1.c]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
|
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This function fits better with the network subsystem, so move it.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
|
