.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ Android Verified Boot 2.0 ========================= This file contains information about the current support of Android Verified Boot 2.0 in U-Boot. Overview -------- Verified Boot establishes a chain of trust from the bootloader to system images: * Provides integrity checking for: * Android Boot image: Linux kernel + ramdisk. RAW hashing of the whole partition is done and the hash is compared with the one stored in the VBMeta image * ``system``/``vendor`` partitions: verifying root hash of dm-verity hashtrees * Provides capabilities for rollback protection Integrity of the bootloader (U-Boot BLOB and environment) is out of scope. For additional details check [1]_. AVB using OP-TEE (optional) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ If AVB is configured to use OP-TEE (see `Enable on your board`_) rollback indexes and device lock state are stored in RPMB. The RPMB partition is managed by OP-TEE (see [2]_ for details) which is a secure OS leveraging ARM TrustZone. AVB 2.0 U-Boot shell commands ----------------------------- Provides CLI interface to invoke AVB 2.0 verification + misc. commands for different testing purposes:: avb init - initialize avb 2 for avb read_rb - read rollback index at location avb write_rb - write rollback index to avb is_unlocked - returns unlock status of the device avb get_uuid - read and print uuid of partition avb read_part - read bytes from partition to buffer avb read_part_hex - read bytes from partition and print to stdout avb write_part - write bytes to by using data from avb read_pvalue - read a persistent value avb write_pvalue - write a persistent value avb verify [slot_suffix] - run verification process using hash data from vbmeta structure [slot_suffix] - _a, _b, etc (if vbmeta partition is slotted) Partitions tampering (example) ------------------------------ Boot or system/vendor (dm-verity metadata section) is tampered:: => avb init 1 => avb verify avb_slot_verify.c:175: ERROR: boot: Hash of data does not match digest in descriptor. Slot verification result: ERROR_IO Vbmeta partition is tampered:: => avb init 1 => avb verify avb_vbmeta_image.c:206: ERROR: Hash does not match! avb_slot_verify.c:388: ERROR: vbmeta: Error verifying vbmeta image: HASH_MISMATCH Slot verification result: ERROR_IO Enable on your board -------------------- The following options must be enabled:: CONFIG_LIBAVB=y CONFIG_AVB_VERIFY=y CONFIG_CMD_AVB=y In addtion optionally if storing rollback indexes in RPMB with help of OP-TEE:: CONFIG_TEE=y CONFIG_OPTEE=y CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB=y CONFIG_SUPPORT_EMMC_RPMB=y Then add ``avb verify`` invocation to your android boot sequence of commands, e.g.:: => avb_verify=avb init $mmcdev; avb verify; => if run avb_verify; then \ echo AVB verification OK. Continue boot; \ set bootargs $bootargs $avb_bootargs; \ else \ echo AVB verification failed; \ exit; \ fi; \ => emmc_android_boot= \ echo Trying to boot Android from eMMC ...; \ ... \ run avb_verify; \ mmc read ${fdtaddr} ${fdt_start} ${fdt_size}; \ mmc read ${loadaddr} ${boot_start} ${boot_size}; \ bootm $loadaddr $loadaddr $fdtaddr; \ If partitions you want to verify are slotted (have A/B suffixes), then current slot suffix should be passed to ``avb verify`` sub-command, e.g.:: => avb verify _a To switch on automatic generation of vbmeta partition in AOSP build, add these lines to device configuration mk file:: BOARD_AVB_ENABLE := true BOARD_AVB_ALGORITHM := SHA512_RSA4096 BOARD_BOOTIMAGE_PARTITION_SIZE := After flashing U-Boot don't forget to update environment and write new partition table:: => env default -f -a => setenv partitions $partitions_android => env save => gpt write mmc 1 $partitions_android References ---------- .. [1] https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md .. [2] https://www.op-tee.org/